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ABSTRACT
Essays on Investment Fluctuation and Market Volatility
by
Chaoqun Lai, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2008
Major Professor: Dr. Terry Glover
Department: Economics
This dissertation includes two different groups of objects in macroeconomics and finan-
cial economics. In macroeconomics, the aggregate investment fluctuation and its relation
to an individual firm’s behavior have been extensively studied for the past three decades.
Most studies on the interdependence behavior of firms’ investment focus on the key issue
of separating a firm’s reaction to others’ behavior from reaction to common shocks. How-
ever, few researchers have addressed the issue of isolating this endogenous effect from a
statistical and econometrical approach. The first essay starts with a comprehensive review
of the investment fluctuation and firms’ interdependence behavior, followed by an econo-
metric model of lumpy investments and an analysis of the binary choice behavior of firms’
investments. The last part of the first essay investigates the unique characteristics of the
Italian economy and discusses the economic policy implications of our research findings.
We ask a similar question in the field of financial economics: Where does stock market
volatility come from? The literature on the sources of such volatility is abundant. As a
result of the availability of high-frequency financial data, attention has been increasingly
directed at the modeling of intraday volatility of asset prices and returns. However, no
empirical research of intraday volatility analysis has been applied at both a single stock
level and industry level in the food industry.
iv
The second essay is aimed at filling this gap by modeling and testing intraday volatility
of asset prices and returns. It starts with a modified High Frequency Multiplicative Compo-
nents GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) model, which
breaks daily volatility into three parts: daily volatility, deterministic intraday volatility, and
stochastic intraday volatility. Then we apply this econometric model to a single firm as well
as the whole food industry using the Trade and Quote Data and Center for Research in
Security Prices data. This study finds that there is little connection between the intraday
return and overnight return. There exists, however, strong evidence that the food recall
announcements have negative impacts on asset returns of the associated publicly traded
firms.
(104 pages)
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Studies on the relation between aggregate fluctuation and individual behavior have
expanded substantially during the past three decades. In macroeconomics, the literature
in aggregate investment fluctuation is abundant, and so is the research on the sources of
aggregate fluctuation and its link to individual firms’ investment behavior. Most studies on
investment interdependence behavior focus on the key issue of separating endogenous effects
from exogenous shocks (Banerjee (1992), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Guiso and Schivardi
(2008)). However, few researchers have addressed the issue of isolating the endogenous
effects from a statistical and econometrical approach. The first essay of this dissertation
presents a distributional test and an econometric model that investigates the amplification
mechanism of aggregate investment fluctuation. We present empirical evidence that the
fraction of firms that experience a large investment rate in the same region and industry is
distributed exponentially. This finding questions the modeling strategy that attributes the
cause of aggregate investment fluctuations to a collection of unspecified exogenous shocks
outside of the model, because such a collection of shocks will form a Gaussian noise to the
aggregate investment.
We propose an alternative model of endogenous investment fluctuations that has a ro-
bust nature to generate the exponential distribution. This econometrical model separates
individual firms’ interdependence reactions from the exogenous effects of common shocks. In
financial economics, stock market volatility and the sources of such volatility have been ex-
tensively studied since the early 1960s. Measuring, modeling, and forecasting time-varying
volatility are considered the central issues of asset pricing, portfolio management, and risk
management (Fama (1965), Merton (1980), Engle and Gallo (2003)). Since the availability
of high-frequency financial data, attention has been increasingly directed at the modeling
of intraday volatility of asset prices and returns. A few studies have looked at the modeling
2strategies of intraday volatility models (Engle and Chanda (2005), Andersen and Bollerslev
(1997)). However, no empirical research of intraday volatility analysis has been applied at
both a single stock level and industry level in the food industry.
The second essay of this dissertation empirically tests and estimates a modified High-
Frequency Multiplicative Components GARCH model using a sample of interday and in-
traday trading data from over 30 publicly traded food sector companies in 2007. It also
examines the dynamics between intraday return and overnight return. The persistence of
intraday stock market return volatility leads us to the investigation of sources of market
volatility. Stock market return volatility can be viewed as a reflection of market partici-
pants’ reactions to market news. Food recall is a common practice in the food industry in the
United States. From the discovery of the first case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE), commonly known as Mad-Cow Disease (MCD), in the United States on Decem-
ber 23, 2003 to the E.coli O157:H7 outbreak that was associated with contaminated Dole
brand baby spinach during the fall of 2006 to the most recent Salmonella outbreak traced
to raw tomatoes, food safety and regulations have drawn more and more public attention.
However, the effects of food recall announcements on the associated publicly traded firms
in the food industry have not been adequately studied. The second essay fills this gap by
examining the effects of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) food recall announcements, which affected over 20 publicly traded
companies in 2007. Results show strong evidence that the announcements of food recalls
have negative impacts on the asset returns of the associated companies.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: the first essay starts with a compre-
hensive review of the investment fluctuation and firms’ interdependence behavior, followed
by an econometric model of lumpy investments and an analysis of the binary choice behav-
ior of firms’ investments. The econometric model is empirically tested and estimated using
a sample of Italian firm level investment panel data from 1983 to 1996. This econometri-
cal model separates individual firms’ interdependence behavior from the effects of common
shocks. The last part of the first essay investigates the unique characteristics of the Italian
3economy and discusses the economic policy implications of our research findings. The sec-
ond essay is aimed at modeling and testing intraday volatility of asset prices and returns. It
starts with a modified High-Frequency Multiplicative Components GARCH model, which
breaks daily volatility into three parts: daily volatility, deterministic intraday volatility,
and stochastic intraday volatility. Then we apply this econometric model to a single firm as
well as to the whole food industry using the Trade and Quote and Center for Research in
Security Prices data. This study finds that there is little connection between the intraday
return and overnight return. There exists, however, strong evidence that the food recall
announcements have negative impacts on the asset returns of associated publicly traded
firms.
4CHAPTER 2
DISTRIBUTIONAL TEST FOR ENDOGENOUS EFFECTS:
CASE OF BINARY INVESTMENTS
2.1 Introduction
Amplification mechanism of firms’ investment demand has been a topic of extensive
discussion. Amplification mechanism plays an important role in both natural and social sci-
ence. For example, in electronic engineering, signal amplification has been used to explain
the use of specific detection methodologies to directly increase the signal in proportion to
the amount of target in the reaction. In medical science, gene amplification is referring to
a cellular process characterized by the production of multiple copies of a particular gene
or genes to amplify the phenotype that the gene confers on the cell. In biology, DNA am-
plification is a term to explain the production of multiple copies of a sequence of DNA or
repeated copying of a piece of DNA. These different applications of amplification share a
common feature, which includes a transmission or response system that delivers a signal
from a certain type of origin to a single or multiple recipients. In economics, an amplifi-
cation mechanism at the firm level directly leads to the comovement of firms’ investment
behavior, which is also known as aggregate investment fluctuation. The neoclassical model
of investment shows that accumulation of capital reflects the slow adjustment of capital
to its desired value. The transition path dynamics of capital adjustment implies that the
speed of adjustment to the steady state is largely determined by the curvature of utility
function (King and Rebelo (1988)). A synthesis of the neoclassical investment model with
the assumption of convex adjustment costs provides conditions for inaction on investment
due to the fixed costs of adjustment. In a seminal paper, Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power
(1999) assume a nonconvex cost of adjustment. Such an idea may seem sensible: in reality,
5many investment projects are not possible in small quantities.1 As a result, at the plant
level we may expect to see periods of low investment activity followed by bursts of invest-
ment activity, which is formally documented as investment spikes or lumpy investments.
Moreover, plant-level data show that lumpy investment is procyclical and more likely for
older capital (Rothschild (1971) and Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999)). Our research
is motivated by two key observations from investment activity studies: first, a significant
portion of investment activity is associated with large variations in the capital stock at the
plant level. Second, an increase in the frequency of investment spikes is a symptom of ag-
gregate variations in investment. The second observation implies that investment activity
at the extensive margin plays a major role in aggregate investment behavior.2
In investment fluctuation research, the questions that draw the most attention are the
implication of a large investment episode and its linkage to the individual firm behavior.
Cooper and Haltiwanger (1992) analyze a machine replacement model where individual
plants decide upon the timing of machine replacement. Their research demonstrates that
downturns are a good time for capital replacement since the opportunity costs are lower. In
a variant of the machine replacement model, Cooper et al. (1999) focus on the threshold of
investment spikes, which are defined as episodes of relatively large investment expenditures.
The significance of their research is twofold. First, the machine replacement model allows
them to analyze the relationship between the probability of a large investment episode and
the timing elapsed since the last spike. Second, their research is among the pioneer work in
explaining the empirical phenomena that, at plant level, bursts of investment are followed,
on average, by periods of low investment.3
The focus of this paper is on the amplification mechanism behind the investment fluc-
tuation. In particular, this paper stresses the importance of interaction effects of firms’
1For instance, the construction of a new plant or the purchase of large machines requires large adjust-
ments of capital stock. In this paper, we assume that small adjustments of the capital stock are either
infeasible or undesirable. This assumption is also consistent with the Menu Theory.
2The effects of large investment spikes by a small number of firms are also confirmed by our data
analysis, which shows that less than 2% of the total number of firms accounts for over 50% of the aggregate
investment fluctuations. The correlation between the contribution of large investment episodes and the
fraction of firms that experience large investment is 0.81. See Section 2.3 for more details.
3This is in contrast to the usual presumption of positive serial correlation in investment activity based
on the standard convex adjustment cost model in the neoclassical analysis of investments.
6investment behavior, which has been regarded as a possible source of comovements of in-
vestment demand at both firm level and sector level. In a classical paper, Long and Plosser
(1983) show the sectoral production comovements due to the pecuniary externality among
firms when they are linked by input and output relations. Models of information spillover
explain the role of learning behavior of firms in the propagation of a firm’s investment to
others. In a more general context, models of interacting individuals have been studied and
results suggest that the interaction gives rise to aggregate shifts in investment endogenously
(Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003)). A common
practice in empirical research is to use aggregate output as a demand-shift instrument for
disaggregate industries. This can be interpreted as aggregate output that has a demand
share for all industries while individual industries constitute only a small fraction of ag-
gregate activity. However, aggregate output is not an adequate universal instrument for
comovement attribution. By definition, aggregate output is a weighed average of all final
goods across different sectors. Thus, the exogeneity and interdependence among different
sectors raise the question of asymptotic bias. To address the issue of asymptotic bias, addi-
tional instruments are needed besides using the aggregate investment variable as an average
measurement.
In a more recent paper, Shea (2002) focuses on the importance of input and output
linkages, aggregate activity spillovers, and local activity spillovers to comovement in post-
war U.S. manufacturing. Shea’s research shows that complementarities contribute directly
to aggregate volatility, even after the aggregate shocks are removed from the data. In
particular, local spillover is the leading factor that explains between 15% and 36% of man-
ufacturing employment volatility. Interindustry complementarity can be categorized into
different forms, including input and output linkages (Long and Plosser (1983)), external
economies of scale (Farmer and Guo (1994)), consumption complementarities (Verbrugge
(1998)), trading externalities (Diamond (1982)), and aggregate demand spillovers (Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989)). In principle, interindustry comovement could be due entirely
to effects of common shocks. For example, fiscal policy may directly affect the demand
7for all capital goods. However, such comovement may also be driven by complementarities
that propagate shocks across industries. For instance, the tax rebate policy may lead to
comovement between the automobile industry and the steel industry not because of the
direct effect of the tax policy on the steel industry but because the tax rebate generates a
higher demand for automobiles and the demand shocks to the auto industry are spilled over
to the steel industry. Complementarities do not simply imply the fact that the activity of
Industry X will move together with that of Industry Y, it also suggests that the amount of
comovement should be explained by the degree of linkage between X and Y.
The key question is how to separate the interaction effect from the common shock
effects in the investment fluctuation. The common shock effects are also known as exogenous
effects, while the interaction effects are documented as endogenous effects. However, it has
been recognized that the models of endogenous effects are often unidentified econometrically.
Manski (1993) formulated this as a reflection problem. Suppose that firm i’s investment
xi is positively affected by the aggregate investment in the reference group r, as xi,r =
α+β
∑
j !=i xj,r.
∑
j !=i xj,r is the summation of all the firms’ investments in reference group
r except firm i. We can estimate β by a linear regression. However, a positive estimate of
β does not necessarily imply the existence of the interaction effect, because a model with
exogenous common shocks xi,r = α + vr is observationally equivalent to the endogenous
effect model.
The econometric unidentification problem is also discussed in a more general context of
uncertainty on investment. Given the ambiguity of the relationship between uncertainty and
investment, it is not surprising that little empirical work has been done aimed at sorting out
various channels where uncertainty affects the investment and the business cycle theories
(Caballero and Leahy (1996)). Theories of investment under uncertainty can be roughly
classified into two groups. The first approach investigates firms in isolation and focuses on
the factors affecting each individual’s investment decision-making process independently.
The second group looks at the firm in relation to other firms and emphasizes covariances
in the investment activities and returns between investment projects. This paper takes an
8approach similar to the second method that considers the interaction effect among firms’
investment demand.
To isolate the effect of interindustry comovement from the effect of common shocks,
most research has been focusing on the linkage between different industries. Shea (2002)
introduces three models to examine the relationship between the observed comovements
and measure of complementarity in the shortrun. The first model of factor demand linkages
implies that the effect of a shock transmitted from Industry X to Industry Y depends on
the strength of upstream and downstream linkages between X and Y. The second model of
aggregate spillover suggests that the effect of a shock to X on Y depends on X’s size.4 The
third model of local spillover implies that the effect of a shock to X on Y depends on both
the size of X and the proximity between X and Y. Industries clustered in the same region
are expected to generate strong comovement.
In this paper, we propose that a particular shape of the distribution of aggregate
fluctuations may serve as a symptom that differentiates the endogenous effect model from
the exogenous common shock model. Often the sources of the exogenous common shock are
driven by many factors. In those cases, the central limit theorem predicts that the common
shock should follow a normal distribution even when the factors that comprise the common
shock follow non-normal distributions. Conversely, when we find a normal distribution in
the aggregate variable, it is reasonable to include an unspecified set of exogenous common
shocks in the model. When the aggregate fluctuations are driven by endogenous effects,
to the contrary, the distribution of the aggregate may not necessarily follow a normal
distribution. The distribution depends on the exact mechanism of the endogenous effects.
Even when the common shock has a particular distribution that is not a normal distri-
bution, the normal distribution reappears for the aggregate actions if each action is indepen-
dently affected by the common shock as in a binary model. Consider the following simple
case of binary action models. There are N agents in each reference group r. Each agent can
4Shea’s research results show a positive relationship between the size of industry and the degree of
transmission. This research result is also confirmed by Baxter and King (1991). Baxter and King show that
shocks to large industries have a larger aggregate impact than shocks to small industries, and, as a result,
shocks to larger industries are transmitted to other sectors at a higher degree.
9choose an action or inaction: ai,r ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose that the probability for an agent i to
act depends on a shock common to all the agents in the group r: Pr(ai = 1) = α+vr . Then,
the distribution of the number of agents who act,
∑N
i=1 ai,r, follows a binomial distribution.
Hence, as N becomes large, the distribution of the normalized fraction of agents who act,∑N
i=1 ai,r/
√
N , asymptotically follows a normal distribution, regardless of the distribution
of the common shock vr.
The aggregate distribution does not necessarily follow the normal distribution if there
are endogenous effects among the binary choice of firms, since the firms’ actions are cor-
related in this case. Let us consider the simplest case of endogenous effects where the
probability for agent i to act (ai,r = 1) depends on the realized action of its neighbor i− 1.
Suppose that Pr(ai,r = 1) = α + βai−1,r, where α > 0 and α + β < 1. In this case, an
action by i = 1 may cause a domino effect to the successive agents. The distribution of the
number of agents who act,
∑N
i=1 ai,r, follows an exponential distribution.
The distribution shape depends on the precise structure of the interactions. In the case
of the herd behavior model (Banerjee (1992)), for example, the agent i’s action is affected
by the actions taken by all the agents who acted before i, i.e., j = 1, 2, . . . , i − 1. We
know that the distribution for the aggregate outcome in this case can degenerate to either
all the agents act or no agents act. However, the exponential distribution appears to be
robust as long as the domino effect does not degenerate to a deterministic cascade. We
can actually show that the exponential distribution characterizes the aggregate outcome in
the case of rational expectations equilibrium in which agents act simultaneously. Suppose
that each agent has a random state variable, si,r, that is drawn from a uniform distribution
over the unit interval. Suppose that agent i acts if si,r ≤ α + β
∑
j !=i aj,r/N . Thus, an
individual firm’s action depends on the realized aggregate actions of the reference group.
An equilibrium action profile is determined for each realization of si,r. When N goes to
infinity, there exists a unique equilibrium
∑N
i=1 ai,r/N = α/(1 − β). When N is finite, a
rational expectations equilibrium can deviate from the limiting equilibrium depending on
the realization of si,r. We can show that the deviation of the aggregate outcome from the
10
limiting case follows a distribution that has an exponential tail.
Upon these observations, we utilize the empirical distribution of the aggregate outcome
to test the endogenous effects model against the common shock model in a binary choice
model of investments. Although several models have been proposed for the endogenous
effects of firms’ investments, there are few empirical investigations for the model, mainly
due to the difficulty of the reflection problem. Recently, Guiso and Schivardi (2006) tackled
the problem by utilizing additional information on the reference network among the firms
as to who observes whom. In this paper, we analyze the same data set of Italian firms as
Guiso and Schivardi but focus on the large investment episodes. We formulate the large
investments as a firm’s binary choice problem, and use the distributional information to
investigate the endogenous effects for the large investments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of lumpy
investment that generates the exponential distribution. The model provides the theoretical
background that relates the distributional evidence and the estimation of the individual
firm’s behavior. Section 3 describes the data and presents empirical evidence that the frac-
tion of firms that engage in large investments follows the exponential distribution rather
than the normal distribution. We also employ a logit model to estimate the binary choice
behavior of firms directly. The last part of Section 3 briefly discusses the economic devel-
opment issue and some unique characteristics of the Italian economy. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 A Model of Endogenous Investment
Fluctuations
Researchers have shown causality between individual firm’s discreet investment and
aggregate investment fluctuation at the industry or the national level. We provide a simple
model to analyze the endogenous investment fluctuations of aggregate investments that arise
from the interaction of the firm level lumpy investment behavior. The results show that
the endogenous aggregate fluctuation may not follow a normal distribution even when the
number of firms approaches infinity if the micro-level discrete investments exhibit strategic
complementarity. This result contradicts with the traditional modeling strategy under the
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assumption of central limit theorem. Specifically, we find that the distribution of aggregate
fluctuation generates an exponential tail. This implies that the interaction of discrete
investments at the firm level or the strategic complementarity overwhelms that law of large
numbers effect in which idiosyncratic shocks cancel out each other.
Empirical studies on firm-level investment abound in recent years. Doms and Dunne’s
(1998) research demonstrate two distinct features of the capital adjustment at the establish-
ment level: occasionally and significantly. Brock and Hommes (1997) introduce the concept
of adaptively rational equilibrium (ARE), where agents adapt their beliefs over time by
choosing from a finite set of different predictor functions conditioned on past observations.
Their results lead to equilibrium dynamics of the endogenous variables. Other researchers
develop interaction-driven models to investigate the aggregate fluctuations (Glaeser et al.
(2003), Brock and Durlauf (2001), and Topa (2001)). Our model shows that the asymp-
totic distribution of the aggregate fluctuation demonstrates a heavier tail than the normal
distribution even when the number of firms tends to infinity.
Consider that there are N firms that produce differentiated goods with a production
function. This finding intrigues other macroeconomists to investigate the aggregate conse-
quence of the micro-level lumpy investment adjustments (Cooper et al. (1999), Caballero
and Engle (1999), Fisher and Hornstein (2000) and Khan and Thomas (2003)). Models of in-
teractions and nonlinear dynamics are focusing on the possibility of endogenous fluctuations
arising from the micro-level nonlinearity. The investment is a composite good produced by
using all theN goods symmetrically by a CES (Constant elasticity of substitution) function.
In summary, the production function is constructed as:
(2.1) yi = kαi .
The investment process can be expressed as:
xi =
 N∑
j=1
z1/µi,j
µN 1−µ(2.2)
ki = (1− δ)ki,0+ xi.(2.3)
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The aggregate price index is normalized to one: P ≡
(∑N
j=1 p
1/(1−µ)
j /N
)1−µ
= 1.
Then the derived demand for zi,j is given in an isoelastic form: z∗i,j = p
−µ/(µ−1)
j xi/N . The
minimum cost satisfies
∑
j pjz
∗
i,j = xi.
There is a representative household who consumes a composite consumption good
that is produced similarly as (2.2): C =
(∑N
i=1 z
1/µ
c,i /N
)µ
. Then the derived demand for
zc,i has the similar form: z∗c,i = p
−µ/(µ−1)
i C. The optimal average expenditure satisfies∑
i piz
∗
c,i/N = C.
The equilibrium conditions for the product markets are yi =
∑
j zj,i + zc,i. Then,
the total demand function is also isoelastic: yi = p
−µ/(µ−1)
i (
∑
j xj/N + C). Defining the
aggregate output as Y ≡
(∑N
j=1 y
1/µ
j /N
)µ
, we obtain
∑
j xj/N + C = Y and the total
demand function:
(2.4) ydi = p
−µ/(µ−1)
i Y.
Each firm is a monopolistic supplier of a differentiated good. Suppose that it maximizes
its profit pi(ki) = piyi − xi by choosing the capital level ki, given the capital level in the
previous period ki,0. Assume that the firm can choose the capital level either at (1−δ)ki,0 or
λ(1− δ)ki,0, where λ > 1/(1− δ). This means that the firm can choose the investment rate
xi/ki,0 either at 0 or (λ− 1)(1− δ). Namely, a firm can choose either a lumpy investment
or an inaction.
By virtue of this assumption of the firm’s binary investment, we can solve for an optimal
inaction range of capital ki in a simple manner. Let the lower bound of the inaction band
be denoted by k∗. The upper bound is thus λk∗. The optimal lower bound must satisfy an
indifference condition pi((1 − δ)k∗) = pi(λ(1− δ)k∗). Now suppose that the initial capital
log ki,0 is an independent random variable that has a density function f over a finite support
[log k∗, logλ+log k∗). Define µ ≡ − log(1−δ)/ logλ and φ ≡ f(k∗/(1−δ))(µ−1)/(µ/α−1).
Then the value of the bound is solved as:
(2.5) k∗ = a0K(µ−1)/(µ/α−1).
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where
a0 =
(
λα/µ − 1
λ− 1
)µ/(µ−α)
(1− δ)−1(2.6)
K =
(∑
i
kα/µi /N
)µ/α
.(2.7)
The equilibrium condition is ki ∈ [k∗, λk∗) for all i where k∗ is defined by (2.5). This
condition allows multiple equilibria in general. Thus, we define an equilibrium selection
algorithm by a best-response dynamics following Vives (1990) in order to choose a unique
equilibrium. The equilibrium chosen by the best-response dynamics has a property that
requires the minimum number of firms, among all the Nash equilibria, who adjust their
capital other than the firms who adjust due to the direct effect of the depreciation.
The best-response dynamics is defined as follows. The initial state is:
ki,1 =
 λ(1− δ)ki,0 if (1− δ)ki,0 < k
∗
0
(1− δ)ki,0 otherwise
(2.8)
K0 =
(∑
i
kα/µi,0 /N
)µ/α
(2.9)
k∗0 = a0K
α(µ−1)/(µ−α)
0 .(2.10)
The subsequent dynamics are:
ki,u+1 =

λki,u if ki,u < k∗u
ki,u/λ if ki,u ≥ λk∗u
ki,u otherwise
(2.11)
Ku =
(∑
i
kα/µi,u
)µ/α
(2.12)
k∗u = a0K
α(µ−1)/(µ−α)
u .(2.13)
Define m0 as the number of firms that adjust upward in step u = 1. Define m1 as
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m0 − µN . Define the number of firms that adjust upward in step u > 1 as mu. Define
mu as negative if the firms adjust downward. The number of adjusting firms are positive
(negative) in every step if m1 > 0 (m1 < 0). Define T as the stopping time of the best
response dynamics, i.e., T = argminumu = 0.
Note that the initial aggregate capital K0 is defined at the level at which the deprecia-
tion is not taken into account. Thus, m0 is the number of firms that adjust upward due to
the direct impact of the depreciation to each firm. If the investment of m0 firms meet the
depreciation exactly, then m1 = 0 and, thus, the adjustment process stops. Define W as
the equilibrium number of firms that engage in the lumpy investment after u = 2, namely,
W ≡∑Tu=2mu. If there were a continuum of firms and if K = K0 at the equilibrium, then
the fraction of firms that engage in the lumpy investment is µ. In a finite economy, W
indicates the deviation from the level that would be stationary in the continuum economy.
We state our main proposition here.
Proposition 1 When λi and δi are heterogeneous across firms,W conditional to m1 obeys:
(2.14) Pr(|W | = w|m1) = C0(eφ−1/φ)−ww−1.5
for a large integer w, where C0 is a constant.
Proof: See Nirei (2006a).
Proposition 1 shows that W follows a distribution that is a mixture of power and
exponential. Since the exponential declines faster than the power, the tail of the distribution
is dominated by the exponential part. This corresponds to our empirical finding that X
follows an exponential distribution.
The parameter φ is the mean number of firms that are affected when an additional
firm engages in lumpy investment. Hence, φ corresponds to the estimated slope in the
logit regression dΛ/dX , which measures the increased probability of lumpy investment due
to an increase in X (the fraction of firms that engage in lumpy investments in the same
reference group). On the other hand, Proposition 1 shows that φ characterizes the speed of
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exponential decline in the tail distribution ofW . Suppose that the exponential decline is fast
enough that W is mostly characterized by the exponential part. Then, by Equation (2.14),
the mean (and standard deviation) of the exponential is the inverse of φ− 1− log φ. Thus,
Proposition 1 connects the two estimates in the next sections: the mean (and standard
deviation) of the exponential distribution of X and the probability slope of the logit model
dΛ/dX .
The mean of the exponential distribution of |Y | is estimated at 0.056. The average
number of firms in Gl,r is 146 (by Table 2.1). Hence, the mean number of affected firms
is estimated at 146 ∗ 0.056 ≈ 8. By solving 1/8 = φ − 1 − logφ, we indirectly obtain the
estimate of φ as φˆ = 0.56. This does not exactly match the logit estimate for Gl,r that is,
dΛ/dX = 0.33. However, it is interesting to observe that these measures fall in roughly the
same ballpark even though they are derived from independent estimation.
The analytical result is sharpened when the lumpiness λi and depreciation δi are ho-
mogeneous across firms.
Proposition 2 When λi and δi are common across firms, then W follows a symmetric
probability distribution function:
(2.15) Pr(|W | = w | m1) = m1e−φ(w+m1)φw(w+m1)w−1/w!.
The tail of the distribution function is approximated as:
(2.16) Pr(|W | = w | m1) ∼ (m1e(1−φ)m1/
√
2pi)(eφ−1/φ)−ww−1.5.
The proof of this proposition is presented as follows: We first derive the asymptotic
distribution ofm1. m0 follows a binomial distribution with probability µ and population N .
Hence, m1/
√
N asymptotically follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance
µ(1− µ).
16
Next we derive the asymptotic distribution of |∑Tu=2 mu| conditional to |m1|. Without
loss of generality, we consider the case m1 > 0.
Lemma 1 mu+1 conditional to mu asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution with mean
muφ as N →∞.
Proof: See Nirei (2006b). First, we show that:
(2.17) N (logKu+1 − logKu)→ mu+1 log λ.
Define ρ = α/µ. The Taylor series expansion of the left hand side yields:
N (logKu+1 − logKu) =
∞∑
n=1
∑
j∈Hu+1
(
kuj
Ku
)ρ ρn−1(logλ)n
n!
+O(1/N )
=
(
k∗u
Ku
)ρ λρ − 1
ρ
∑
j∈Hu+1
λs
u
j ρ +O(1/N )
=
λρ − 1
ρ
∑
j∈Hu+1 λ
suj ρ∑N
j=1 λ
suj ρ/N
+O(1/N ).(2.18)
The residual term in the first equation is of order 1/N , because it consists of the terms involv-
ing ∂Ku/∂kuj , which is of order 1/N , and because the number of terms (the size of Hu+1) is
finite with probability one as is shown later. The second equation holds since k∗uj is constant
across j. For the same reason, the third equation obtains, since Ku = k∗u(
∑N
j=1 λ
suj ρ/N )1/ρ
holds. The average
∑N
j=1 λ
suj ρ/N converges to E[λs
u
j ρ] as N → ∞ almost surely. The ex-
pectation is equal to
∫ 1
0 λ
suj ρdsuj = (λρ− 1)/(ρ logλ), because the following three facts hold
as N → ∞ as we see later, namely, suj for j ∈ H1 is uniformly distributed in [1 − 1/q, 1),
suj for j /∈
⋃u
v=1 Hv is uniformly distributed in [0, 1 − 1/q), and
⋃u
v=1Hv is finite with
probability one. Also,
∑
j∈Hu+1 λ
suj ρ converges to mu+1 in distribution. This is because
suj < φ(logK
u − logKu−1)/ logλ for j ∈ Hu+1 and the right-hand-side is of order 1/N as
(2.18) shows. Thus, the summation follows a binomial distribution. Hence, we obtain for
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u ≥ 1 a convergence in distribution:
(2.19) N (logKu+1 − logKu)→ mu+1 logλ.
Next we examine mu conditional to mu−1 for u ≥ 2. We have Pr(j ∈ Hu|j /∈
∪v=1,2,...,u−1Hv) = (φ(logKu − logKu−1)/ logλ)/((N −
∑u−1
v=1 mv)/N ). Thus, mu follows
Bin(N −∑u−1v=1 mv, (φ(logKu − logKu−1)/ logλ)/((N −∑u−1v=1 mv)/N )). This defines the
stochastic process mu completely. As we let N → ∞, the limit (2.19) holds and the bino-
mial distribution of mu converges to a Poisson distribution with mean φmu−1 for u ≥ 3.
For u = 2, m2 converges in distribution to a Poisson with mean φm where the distribution
of m is defined conditionally on m1.
Since a Poisson distribution is infinitely divisible, the Poisson variable withmean φmu−1
is equivalent to a mu−1-times convolution of a Poisson variable with mean φ.
Thus, the best-response dynamics is a valid algorithm of equilibrium selection (see
Feller (1957)). Let T denote the stopping time. Using the previous asymptotic results,
we have W → ∑Tu=2 mu in distribution. By using the property of the Poisson branching
process (see Kingman (1993)), we obtain an infinitely divisible distribution called Borel-
Tanner distribution for the accumulated sum W conditional to m2 as:
(2.20) Pr(W = w | m2) = (m2/w)e−φw(φw)w−m2/(w−m2)!
for w = m2, m2+1, . . .. By using m2 to follow the Poisson distribution with mean φm1, we
obtain (2.15) in the Proposition as follows:
Pr(W = w | m1) =
w∑
m2=0
((m2/w)e−φw(φw)w−m2/(w−m2)!)e−φm1(φm1)m2/m2!
= (φm1e−φ(w+m1)/w)
w∑
m2=1
(φw)w−m2(φm1)m2−1/((w−m2)!(m2 − 1)!)
= (φm1e−φ(w+m1)/w)(φw+ φm1)w−1/(w − 1)!
= m1e−φ(w+m1)φw(w +m1)w−1/w!(2.21)
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Approximation (2.16) is obtained by applying the Stirling formula w! ∼ √2pie−www+0.5:
m1e
−φ(w+m1)φw(w +m1)w−1/w!
∼ m1e−φm1(e−φφ)w(w+m1)w−1/(
√
2pie−www+0.5)
= (m1e−φm1/
√
2pi)(e1−φφ)ww−1.5(1 +m1/w)w(1 +m1/w)−1
∼ (m1e(1−φ)m1/
√
2pi)(eφ−1/φ)−ww−1.5.(2.22)
This completes the proof.
Finally, we can show that the fluctuation of the fraction of investing firms, X =W/N ,
has a positive variance even at the limit of N →∞ if φ = 1.
Proposition 3 limN→∞Var(X) > 0, when φ = 1 and the distribution of s is uniform.
Proof: See Nirei (2006a)
2.3 Empirical Investigation
2.3.1 Data and Variables
We use longitudinal data of Italian firms drawn from the Company Accounts Data
Service (CADS). We use its annual balance-sheet data on a sample of over 30,000 firms
from 20 regions, 14 industries over a 14-year period from 1983 to 1996. The original data
contains 306,364 observations and 47 variables. The main variables used in this paper
include region code, industry code, profit, cash flow, investment rate, investment-over-
capital rate, inflation rate, and real capital.5
We focus on the fraction of firms that experience large investment episodes in a given
industry-region-year. First we define an investment-capital ratio, IPK(i, t), for each firm
i and year t. Then, we convert the investment-capital ratio into a binary variable, d(i, t),
which takes 1 if IPK(i, t) > d¯ and zero otherwise. We take the threshold d¯ at 20% for most
5The original region and industry code data is a two-digit string variable. We do not have further
information on the actual names of the represented region or industry.
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TABLE 2.1
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Logit Regression
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
d(i, t) 281858 .233 .423 0 1 0
X(Gl, t) 3200 0.229 0.105 0 0.621 0.188
I(Gl, t) 2574 1.117 0.825 0.025 13.155 1.000
N (Gl, t) 3200 17898 13730 22 51739 1559
X(Gr, t) 3200 0.227 0.108 0.000 0.750 0.179
I(Gr, t) 2574 1.117 0.882 0.078 11.885 0.976
N (Gr, t) 3200 22478 26391 60 94008 432
X(Gl,r, t) 3200 0.227 0.137 0.000 0.866 0.191
I(Gl,r, t) 2574 1.221 1.371 0.000 15 0.901
N (Gl,r, t) 3200 1220 2194 10 16194 57
of our estimation.6 Then we define the fraction, X(G, t) =
∑
i∈G d(i, t)/N (G), where G is
the reference group andN (G) is the number of firms in the groupG. SinceX is a fraction, its
behavior can be overly volatile for the groups that have a small number of firms. We drop the
groups that have firms less than 10.7 We also define Y (G, t) ≡ X(G, t)−∑GX(G, t)/(#G)
in which the yearly effect on X(G, t) that is common across G is subtracted. Our main goal
is to characterize the cross-section distribution of X (or Y ).
For most of the cases, we define G as a set of firms that operate in the same industry and
region, denoted as Gl,r. For the regression analysis in Section 2.3.2, we also use the reference
group where firms are in the same region but in different industries (Gr) The regression anal-
ysis also uses an aggregate investment variable in order to capture its direct effect on d(i, t).
The aggregate investment is defined as I(G, t) =
∑
i∈G Ii,t/(
∑
i∈G
∑
t Ii,t/(N (G)T (G))),
where Ii,t represents the real investment of firm i in year t, and T is the total years in
observation. The variables of interest are summarized in Table 2.1.8
6A similar pattern is found when we change the threshold to 30% and 10%. See Appendix Figure A.1
and Figure A.2.
7The original data file contains 306,363 observations. We exclude the year 1982 for nonvalid investment
data and one outlier of the variable “ioverk.” This reduces the sample size to 291,933. Then we exclude
small reference groups that contain less than 10 firms, which result in the sample size 281,858.
8Reference groups with less than 10 firms are dropped from the observation. Gl, t refers to the reference
group in the same industry but different region in year t. Gr, t refers to the reference group in the same
region but different industries in year t. Gl,r , t refers to the reference group in the same industry and same
region in year t.
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FIGURE 2.1
Histogram of Firms’ Investment Rates IPK(i, t)
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Our data analysis shows that the aggregate investment rate (investment-capital ra-
tio), the portion of the aggregate investment rate that accrues to the large investments of
individual firms, and that the fraction of firms that experience the large investments are
positively correlated with each other: The correlation is 0.81 between the contribution of
large investment episodes and the fraction of firms that experience large investment, 0.25
between the contribution of large investment episodes and the aggregate investment rate
increases to 0.70 when the boom years 1994 to 1996 are excluded) and 0.19 between the
fraction and the aggregate.9
Figure 2.1 depicts a histogram of IPK(i, t). We can see that the distribution is highly
skewed to the right. 24% of the samples have investment rates less than 2%. The tail is
long, and it implies that a relatively small fraction of firms has a large impact on aggre-
9When we increase the threshold to 30%, the correlation between the contribution of large investment
episodes, and the fraction of firms that experience large investment, correlation between the contribution of
large investment episodes and the aggregate investment rate, and correlation between the fraction and the
aggregate are 0.88, 0.27, and 0.14, respectively. When we drop the threshold to 10%, the correlation changed
to 0.54, 0.61, and 0.32. As we expected, when we look at the more skewed tail part of the distribution, the
correlations among the contribution, the fraction, and the aggregate become more evident.
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gate investments.10 The abnormally long tail of the investment capital ratio chart puts
a question on the reason behind the engaging firm’s investment behavior. We report two
histograms of the investment spikes in the Appendix section11. The investment capital ratio
is traditionally defined as capital accumulation over the initial capital level. The definition
of capital accumulation is subject to controversy and ambiguity. Our research defines it
as the real investment in tangible means of production. The measurement of accumulation
is usually based on either the monetary value of investments or the change in the value of
capital stock. Thus, in our paper a high rate of capital accumulation indicates a high level of
investments in new construction or new tools. The German Economic Miracle in the 1930s
to 1950s is one example of high investment capital ratio supporting growth. The cluster of
high investment capital ratios among the Italian firms may be explained by the relatively
small base of initial capital level since our research does find evidence that the majority of
the Italian firms were small- and medium-size during 1980s and 1990s. Given a low base
level of capital, any increase in the initial capital will produce a relatively high investment
capital ratio. This investment spike can also be explained by governmental economic stim-
ulus policies. For instance, it could be the case that a certain group of firms either in the
same region or industry respond simultaneously to the favorable regional policy.
Figure 2.2 plots the histogram of X(Gl,r, t) for each year. The frequency on the ver-
tical axis shows the number of firms at a particular level of investment. We observe a
general pattern of the distributions: they are skewed to the right and their center loca-
tion fluctuates over the years. Figure 2.3 shows the histogram of Y (Gl,r, t) ≡ X(Gl,r, t) −∑
l,rX(Gl,r, t)/(#Gl,r), in which the yearly effect on X is subtracted.12 The histogram of
Y is fairly symmetric.
10A similar pattern is found when we change the threshold to 30% and 10%. See Appendix Tables A.1
and A.2.
11Figure A.3 shows the frequency of firms that experience investment rates from 1 to 50, and Figure
A.4 depicts histogram of investment rates between 1 and 100.
12#Gl,r is the total number of years in reference group G.
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FIGURE 2.2
Historical Histogram of X
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FIGURE 2.3
Histogram of Y
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FIGURE 2.4
Semi-Log Plots of Cumulative Distribution of |Y | for Positive (Upper Line) and Negative
Values (Lower Line).
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Figure 2.4 shows a semi-log plot of the same distribution of Y .
To produce the plot, Y is first ranked in a descending order, and the log of the rank
divided by the total number of observations is plotted against |Y | for both positive and
negative sides. In the semi-log scale, an exponential distribution function would show as a
linear line. Our plot demonstrates that the positive side of the distribution of Y is well-
represented by an exponential distribution. The negative side has a kink, beyond which the
distribution shows a faster decline than the positive side. The faster decline in the negative
side can be caused by the boundary effect on X which takes nonnegative values. X(Gl,r, t)
has a mean of 0.23 and a standard deviation of 0.14 (from Table 2.1, hence, it is natural that
the distribution of Y shows a boundary effect at around −0.15. This explanation is also
consistent with the patterns of yearly distributions shown in Figure 2.2. The distribution
is skewed in the years when the distributions are close to zero, such as in 1984 and 1992,
whereas the distribution is not skewed in the boom years when the distributions are far from
zero, such as in 1994, 1995, and 1996. The inverse of the slope of the semi-log plot provides
an estimate for the mean (and also standard deviation) parameter for the exponential
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TABLE 2.2
Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality
Variable Observations Mean Std Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Y 3,200 .000 .091 .592 5.194
distribution. A least-square regression for the positive side yields an estimate of the slope
−14.128 (standard error 0.017) with an R-squared 0.998, and the negative side yields an
estimate of the slope −18.651 (standard error 0.066) with an R-squared 0.980. As we can
see from the semi-log plot, the positive side of |Y | is approximately linear, indicating that
an exponential distribution fits the data fairly well.
The good fit by an exponential distribution also can be shown using a QQ-plot and
empirical distribution test. Figure 2.5 plots the quantile of the exponential distribution
against |Y | for negative value of Y (left) and the positive value of Y (right). For comparison
purposes, we reported the quantile of the normal distribution against the total value of Y
in Figure 2.6. The linear relation in the exponential QQ plots confirms our previous finding
that the hypothetical distribution fits well to the empirical distribution, especially for the
positive value of |Y |, which characterizes the investment spikes of the firms.
Now we examine statistical properties of hypothetical parametric distributions for Y .
First we conduct the usual normality test based on higher moments. Table 2.2 shows the
higher moments of Y . The large kurtosis indicates that Y is leptokurtic. The normality
test, such as the Jarque-Bera statistic, overwhelmingly rejects the normality hypothesis.
Next we compare alternative parameterizations. We consider the case in which the
distribution of Y follows exponential distributions for the positive side and the negative
side follows with possibly a different mean, namely the likelihood function is Pr(Y = y|y >
0) = λ+e−λ+y and Pr(Y = y|y < 0) = λ−e−λ−(−y). We call this an exponential distribution
hypothesis. We also consider the case in which both positive and negative sides of Y follow
an exponential distribution with the same mean 1/λ: Pr(Y = y) = (λ/2)e−λ|y|.
Table 2.3 shows the results of the maximum-likelihood estimation for each distribution.
The estimated mean of the exponential distribution is 0.071 (standard error 0.000) for the
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FIGURE 2.5
QQ-Plots of |Y | Against the Exponential Distribution for the Positive
(Right Column) and Negative Values (Left Column)
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FIGURE 2.6
QQ-plot of Cumulative Distribution of |Y | Against
Normal Distribution
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-.6 -.4 -.2 .0 .2 .4 .6
Y
N
o
rm
a
l Q
u
a
n
til
e
Theoretical Quantile-Quantile
26
TABLE 2.3
Parameter Estimates for Each Distribution
Exponential Laplace Normal
Parameter 1 0.071 0.068 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Parameter 2 0.064 0.076
(0.000) (0.001)
Log-likelihood 3,204 3,200 2,990
Vuong’s statistic 4.74 Null
4.71 Null
1.85 Null
positive side and 0.064 (standard error 0.000) for the negative value of Y . The estimated
λ for the Laplacian is 0.068, which is the middle value for the exponential slopes for the
positive and negative sides. The exponential hypothesis has a larger log-likelihood value
than the Laplacian hypothesis, because the Laplacian is equivalent to the exponential with
restriction λ+ = λ−.
Note that the log-likelihood is the smallest for the Gaussian parametrization. We
test the normality by utilizing Vuong’s test based on Kullback-Leibler information cri-
terion (Vuong (1989) and Greene (2000)). Let L(i;H) denote the likelihood of sam-
ple point i under the hypothesis H . Define the log-likelihood ratio for each i as mi =
logL(i;H1)− logL(i;H0). Vuong suggested a statistic V ≡
√
Nm¯i/Std(mi), which follows
a standard normal distribution if the hypotheses H0 and H1 are “equivalent” in the sense
of Kullback-Leibler information. Thus, if V computed for H1 against the null H0 is greater
than 1.96, then the null is rejected in favor of the alternative at the 5% significance level.
Vuong’s statistics are reported in the same table for the exponential and the Laplacian
hypotheses against the Gaussian null hypothesis and for the exponential against Gaussian.
The exponential and the Laplacian are favored more than the Gaussian at the 5% signifi-
cance level, while the exponential against the Laplacian is inconclusive at 5%. In sum, our
data on the distribution of the fraction of firms that engage in lumpy investments favor
the model that generates an exponential distribution more than the models that generate
normal distributions for the aggregate fluctuation of investments.
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2.3.2 Logit Regression of Investment Choice
In this section we estimate the individual firm’s decision on lumpy investment. Each
firm faces a binary choice d(i, t) ∈ {0, 1} whether or not to engage in a lumpy investment.
We formulate the binary choice by a Logit model whose independent variables include
I−i,t (the aggregate investment in the reference group G such that i ∈ G), X−i,t (the
fraction of the firms that engage in lumpy investment in G . i), and the firm’s demographic
characteristics. The variables I−i,t and X−i,t are defined slightly differently from I(G, t)
and X(G, t) used in the previous sections. They do not include the contribution of the own
investment of i, namely, I−i,t =
∑
j∈G,j !=i Ii,t/(
∑
j∈G
∑
t Ij,t/(N (G)T (G))) and X−i,t =∑
j∈G,j !=i d(j, t)/(N (G)− 1). It turns out that the lumpy investment is largely affected by
X−i,t, whereas the effect of I−i,t is nonsignificant.
The comovement of investment problem is complicated by the common shock, which
makes it hard to isolate the interaction among firms from the firm’s reaction to the industrial
shock to other industries in the same region. We address this problem starting with the
identification of input and output linkages among different industries. This is inspired by
Shea (2002). First we convert the original 4-digit industry code of the Italian firms to a
2-digit industry code that is consistent with the OECD classification.13 With the data
available, we end up with 25 industries. Secondly, we construct a dummy variable for the
industry that is different from the region dummy and the year dummy. We use the 1985
version of the Italian transaction table to identify the industrial relation. The details of
this dummy variable is discussed after the estimation. All the explanatory variables are
constructed under the ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) classification.
In order to solve the endogeneity problem, we construct an instrumental variable to
identify the portion of industry’s investments that are induced by the exogenous industrial
shocks. The direct logit regression of the binary lumpy investment dependent variable on
X−i,t and I−i,t is not justifiable since the explanatory variable is composed of the left-hand-
side dependent variable. So we use a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) method first proposed
13The second revision of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC, Rev.2) is designed
to ensure compatibility among all OECD countries. The detail of this conversion can be found at the OECD
website: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/43/2673344.pdf.
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by Vuong and Rivers.14 In the first step we did an OLS regression of X−i,t on the lagged
I−i,t−115 and industry dummy variable. In the second stage we use the estimated fraction
variable as the instrumental variable (IV)in the logit regression.
Stage 1.-Obtain the least-squares estimator from regression of X−i,t on the lagged
I−i,t−1 and industry dummy:
(2.23) ˆX−i,t = α0 + α1I−i,t−1 +
25∑
j=1
αjDl,
where Dl is an industry dummy variable that equals to 1 for the industry-the same as
in the dependent variable or in the closely related industry identified by the input-output
linkage.16
Stage 2.-Estimate the probability of a firm experiencing an investment jump using logit
regression.
Assume that the probability of a firm experiencing an investment jump follows a logistic
distribution with parameter βZi,t:
(2.24) Pr(d(i, t) = 1) = Λ(βZi,t) = 1/(1 + e−βZi,t),
where βZi,t is a linear combination of several independent variables:
(2.25) βZi,t = β0 + βtDt + βlDl + βrDr + βxX−i,t + βII−i,t + βcCFi,t + βΠΠi,t.
Besides the fraction variable X−i,t and the aggregate investment I−i,t defined as before,
14See Chapter 15.5 of Greene (2000).
15In our regression we found that the OLS regression of X−i,t on the lagged I−i,t−1 outperforms the
OLS regression on I−i,t of the same year. The estimated coefficient on lagged I−i,t−1 is around 0.004 at the
1% significance level.
16We use the Total (domestic+imported) Transactions Input Output Table of Italy in 1985, which is
downloadable from the OECD website. First we formulate the industry share table, which shows the share
of industry j’s input demand for the total output of industry i. Then we pick a threshold value of the share
to measure the strength of this industrial linkage. In other words, we label the linkage as strong if the share
is above the threshold and weak if it is below. The share table is available upon request. The estimation
results are not changed very much when we use the capital formation table.
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CFi,t is the firm’s cash flow,17 Πi,t is the profitability variables, and two dummy variables.
Dt is a year dummy that equals to 1 for the year same as in the dependent variable, and
Dr is a region dummy.
Tobin’s q model and formula proposed by Hayashi (1982) were considered the standard
measure of the unobservable productivity of capital.Firm’s investment behavior is essentially
driven by the marginal productivity of capital but without the data of the market values
we build our model upon production data. Bayer (2006) proposed a gap model which
measures capital profitability from the sales, employment and wage data. We follow the
similar approach here. We start with the static optimization problem of a firm under a
Cobb-Douglas production function:
(2.26) Y = ALαLKαK ,
The variable A represents total factor productivity. The first-order conditions imply that:
(2.27) wL = αLY,
and
(2.28) rK = αKY.
When substituting optimal employment into the production function, we can get:
(2.29) Y = [A(
αL
w
)αL]
1
1−αLK
αK
1−αL .
17The importance of financing constraints suggests that cash flow plays an important role in a firm’s
investment spending. We include the cash flow variable here as a supplement explanatory variable to Tobin’s
q. The regression results are not affected very much when we exclude the cash flow variable.
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After replacing back Y we can get a simple log form of measuring the profitability of
capital,
(2.30) Π = ln(Y )− αK
1− αL ln(K).
The expenditure shares for both labor and capital are heterogeneous between firms and
it is impossible to directly estimate αL and αK due to the dynamic structure of the panel
data.18 We calculated the expenditures share as the average level across all the firms by
different industries.19
The parameter βx measures the impact of the other firms’ lumpy investments on the
probability for i to choose a lumpy investment. The probability Λ increases to 1 when βx
increases to infinity, implying that the firm’s investment is perfectly correlated with the
other firms’ lumpy investments at the limit β →∞; When β → 0, the probability becomes
0.5 regardless of the value of X−i,t, implying that the firm is completely indifferent to the
other firms’ lumpy investments.
We choose the reference groups as industry-region-year and region-year. Since we are
using industry input-output linkage, it makes more sense to investigate the inter-industry
relation among the firms. We focus on the coefficients for X−i,t. The estimation results
are reported in Table 2.4. The estimated coefficient for X is about 5, and it is significantly
different from zero at 1% for all specifications. The coefficient forΠ is positive and significant
while the estimate for CF is nonsignificant.20 The margional probability of the fraction
variable X is .87 at the significant level. This shows that for a 1% increase of the fraction
of the number of firms experiencing an investment spike, there will be a .87% increase of
18See Bayer (2006) for more details on this exogeneity estimation issue.
19The total production Y is measured as sales. Labor cost is provided in our data and capital cost is
calculated through the relationship that value added is the sum of labor cost, capital cost, and profits. The
industrial expenditure share measure is preferred to the individual measure when we compare the regression
results. This can be explained as a result of the heterogeneity across firms.
20In the literature it has been documented that additional cash flow variable becomes insignificant when
it is used as an alternative measure of Tobin’s Q. But it is slightly different since we use it along with the
Tobin’s Q. Actually, when we drop the profitability variable, the estimate on cash flow is still insignificant.
For more discussion see Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner (1999) and Vlieghe, Bond, Klemm, Newton-Smith,
and Syed (2003).
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TABLE 2.4
Estimation Results of the Logit Model
Industry-Region-Year Region-Year
Constant -1.162 -3.247
(.324) (1.077)
X 5.825 12.703
(.333) (4.482)
I -.019 -.004
(.010) (.015)
Π .004 .006
(.001) (.001)
CF .000 -.000
(.000) (.000)
∂Λ/∂X .870 1.915
(.060) (.676)
∂Λ/∂I -.001 -.001
(.001) (.002)
∂Λ/∂Π .001 .001
(.000) (.000)
∂Λ/∂CF .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
Log-Likelihood -61513.000 -60565.000
the probability of a single firm increasing its own investment level.
2.3.3 Italian Economy Investigation and
Economic Development Implications
Our study shows that some unique characteristics of the Italian economy provide us
with an ideal platform for the empirical research on individual firm investment behavior
analysis during the 1980s and 1990s.
The main characteristic of the Italian economy in the postwar period includes a series of
profound dualisms: the industrialized North and the underdeveloped South, the public and
private sectors, and large industrial corporations and small family-type businesses. Efforts
of the state to mitigate gaps among regional imbalanced development resulted in public
sector inefficiencies and redundant industrial projects. The economic policy of Christian
Democrats, which dominated Italian politics for a long time, was expansionary and un-
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stable.21 The solution to the troubled economic system lies in small- and medium-size
enterprises, which is considered as the backbone of the Italian economy.
The logit regression results indicate a significant level of clustering of investment fluc-
tuation. Table 2.4 shows that firms are not responsive to the aggregate level of investments
but reactive to other firm’s behavior within the same reference group. Also the level of
interaction among the firms varies according to different reference groups. Our research
finds that when there is a 1% increase in the fraction of firms engaging in lumpy invest-
ments, the probability of an individual firm in the same region and same industry increasing
its investment will increase by .87%. If the firm is in the same region but from different
industries, the probability jumps to almost 2%. This result serves as an indication that the
clustering of firms’ investments may also be affected by factors outside of our model. Based
on our investigation of the Italian economy, there is one distinct characteristic that gives
us more insight into this interdependence behavior of firms’ investments-the industrial dis-
trict. These industrial districts are geographically defined production systems characterized
by a large number of firms that are involved at various stages and in various ways in the
production of a homogeneous product (Pyke, Becattini, and Sengenberger (1998)). Most
of the small- and medium-size firms are concentrated in traditional sectors such as textile,
footwear, leather products, ceramic tiles, wooden furniture, musical instruments, and ma-
chine tools. The majority of successful small firms have been clustered in industrial districts
since at least the 1970s.22 By 1981, more than three-quarters of Italian manufacturing was
in firms with fewer than 500 employees. In 1992, small- and medium-size firms captured
70% of total sales in the Italian economy and 40% of the country’s exports (Sharpe (1992)).
In particular, the geographic concentration of small firms in manufacturing sectors is gen-
21Management positions in public sector companies became the main source of patronage, and state-
owned enterprises became instruments of industrial policy. The inefficient industrial policy consisted of
random public interventions, including extensive bailing out of large falling private companies. Such intrusion
of the state politics in the economy also created numerous opportunities for corruption. See Baldassarri and
Modigliani (1998) and OECD Economic Survey: Italy 1990/1991 (OECD (2002)).
22For example, in northeastern Italy, there is a triangle business district geographically defined by Udine,
Pisa, and Ascoli Piceno, and centered in Bologna and Florence. The majority of successful small firms have
been clustered in industrial districts. For example, textiles are principally manufactured in Prato and Biella,
furniture in Poggibonsi, ceramic tiles in Sassuolo, kitchen utensils in Omegna, and sport files in Gardone
Val Trompia.
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erally considered as the essential feature of the Italian industrial districts. There are two
crucial characteristics of the industrial district: first is the existence of networks between
small firms; and a second feature is the combination of cooperation and competition among
the firms. The flexibility of labor is particularly important to the economies of scales for the
district as a whole. The international competition pressure resulted in a delicate balance
between the readiness to share information and services and competition on a wide range
of scales, such as price, quality, design, and speed (OECD (2002)).
The interaction among small and medium-sized firms in industrial districts during the
1980s is the essence of the Italian economy’s competitive advantage in the traditional in-
dustrial sector. The possible drawbacks of small volume production are offset by the effects
of economies of scale. These economies of scale effects are external to the firm but internal
to the district (Pyke et al. (1989)). The geographical concentration and size advantage
directly contribute to the firms’ flexibility and ability to generate external economies. The
flexibility consisted of speed of adjustment and innovation.23 This has enabled firms to
continuously innovate and upgrade production line and capture the market share at the
most profitable level. The cooperation and competition among the firms in the industrial
districts also generate other externalities to the economy as a whole. These externalities
include knowledge and skills training, research and development funding, information shar-
ing and communication among the market. It is the balance between cooperation and
competition that enable industrial districts to achieve the efficiency of vertically integrated
corporations without losing any of their flexibility (OECD (2002)). Sociologist Carlo Triglia
has summarized the sources of success of small- and medium-sized firms into three factors:
first, interaction of small- and medium-size urban centers with traditional goods production
skills directly cultivated entrepreneurship and innovation; second, family-based agricultural
structure that ultimately supplied inexpensive source of labor to the industries; and third,
Catholic and socialist political traditions with a focus on the creation of a middle class
social base.
23Evidence of firms’ quick response to market signals and change of the business environment can be
found in OECD Economics Survey: Italy 1988/1989 (OECD (2002)).
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TABLE 2.5
Selected Variables in Public Sector Finance (Percentage Ratios to GDP)
1979 1986 1991
Total spending 41.2 51.53 9.0
Interest payments 5.8 5.10 2.0
Personnel 10.8 11.7 12.7
Pensions 9.6 11.2 12.4
Transfer to enterprises 2.8 3.1 2.4
Total revenues 31.6 39.4 43.7
Tax revenues 16.5 21.9 25.6
Social security contributions 12.8 13.9 14.7
Total debt 61.6 88.2 104.0
Our research finds that there is another important factor that is unique to the Italian
economy-the nation’s inefficient political system and government policies. Paradoxically, the
state often intervened to protect big industries and large enterprises for geopolitical reasons,
which decreases the efficiency of the whole economy, but, at the same time, it resigned the
regulation responsibility of small industries almost entirely to the private sector. Evidence
of the government’s loss of regulation can be found in tax evasion, unregulated labor, and
communal welfare during the economic hardship. For instance, the exemption of firms
with fewer than 15 employees from job protection legislation until May 1990 resulted in a
surge in the small firm employment during that period. The freedom in the small industries,
especially in the labor section, contributed significantly to the growth of the Italian economy
during the 1980s. Table 2.5 reports selected variables in the public sector of finance of the
Italian government during the 1980s and 1990s (Miscossi and Padoan (1995)).
However, the combination of economic and political crisis, coupled with Italy’s en-
try into the European Monetary System (EMS) and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty,
put the Italian economy into a serious postwar crisis and the nation’s worst recession in
1992.24 Both EMS and the Maastricht Treaty severely limited the state’s power in economic
matters. The recession in 1992 was considered the realization of the failure of the Italian
24In September 1992, the government of Giuliano Amato was forced to abandon the EMS and devalue
the currency.
35
economic model, which is constructed around mass political parties, large public sector, and
state protection of the largest industries. This model relied on excessive deficit spending,
including both public deficit and current account deficit, which required high interest rates
to ensure a continued placement of the public debts and maintenance of the lira exchange
rate. The high interest rates squeezed out private investments and boosted import indus-
tries. Small- and medium-sized firms were suffering from the economic crisis as well. The
new challenges and difficulties demanded a revolutionary change in the Italian economic
model, especially a reduction in costs imposed by the inefficient infrastructure of services
and public administration. In general, flexibility and efficiency at the firm level were no
longer sufficient to save the economy and restructuring was needed in the state and local
public sector (Lane (1992)).
Based on the model analysis and the investigation of the Italian economy in the 1980s
and the 1990s, our research shows that firms are reactive to the total number of firms that
exhibit large investment behaviors while irresponsive to the aggregate level of investment
in the same reference group, i.e., industrial districts. We can also extend this argument to
the framework of economic development.25
Among the different theories of economic development, the most popular theories are
economic base theory, sector theory, and growth pole theory.
The first two theories are based on certain classifications of the economy’s industries.
Economic base theory categories the economy into basic and nonbasic sectors. Sector the-
ory categorizes the economy into primary (agricultural, forestry, and fishing), secondary
(manufacturing and mining), and tertiary (trade and services) sectors. The essential dy-
namics of development are based on the external demand for a region’s products and the
economic base multiplier effects. According to these two theories and their application to
our investment interaction analysis, government should focus on industrial recruitment and
promotion in the basic sector or primary sector and facilitate expansion of existing export
25The Economic Development Administration summarizes the importance of understanding the eco-
nomic development theory in the following terms:“Theories used by economic developers determine, either
explicitly or implicitly, how these developers understand economic development, the questions they ask
about the process, the information they collect to analyze development, and the development strategies they
pursue” (EDA (2007), p.2).
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industries through infrastructure upgrades. The major weakness of economic base theory
is its arbitrary distinction between basic and nonbasic sectors, and failure to recognize that
regional economies are an integrated component of mutually dependent activities. Similarly,
sector theory focuses on the internal economic structure and the local economy but fails to
account for the role of exports in local growth. The government can improve the overall
efficiency of the economy through reconciliation between the basic and nonbasic sectors and
by promoting the effects of economies of scale.
Growth pole theory is also known as theories of concentration and diffusion, which
focuses on industries that attract growth and leads to backwash effects for surrounding
areas. The crucial question is the identification of those growth poles or growth centers.
Based on our previous analysis, government policy will be more efficient if it targets at
stimulating more firms in investment behavior rather than increasing the overall level of
investment. There are a number of ways governments at both national and local levels
can promote the development of the overall economy. The most direct method is through
public investment in infrastructure, such as transportation, communication, power, hi-tech
or research center, and education system. The second channel is through the public subsidy
of private investment, including tax abatement, purchase of property, incentives to relocate,
etc. The policy implication of our research for the local government is to allocate the budget
in such a way that would benefit a wide range of firms rather than benefiting a concentrated
number of firms or a particular region.
2.4 Concluding Comments
This paper argues that the distribution of the fraction of firms that engage in large
investments provides a useful test for the existence of endogenous effects among the firms’
investment decisions. Testing of the endogenous effects is often a challenge because it is
observationally equivalent to the model with exogenous common shocks. We argue that, in
a binary choice model, the common shock results in the normal distribution of the number
of firms that engage in the lumpy investment whereas the endogenous effects leads to a
nonnormal distribution that is better characterized by an exponential distribution.
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We investigate the panel of investment data for Italian firms. We construct the fraction
of firms that engage in the investment with which the investment-capital ratio of the firm
exceeds a certain threshold. The fraction samples are constructed for three definitions of
reference groups, namely, a region-year cell, an industry-year cell, and a region-industry-
year cell. Those samples constitute a distribution of the fraction of investing firms for each
definition of the reference group. The results show that the normal distribution hypothesis
is rejected by the empirical distributions, whereas the exponential distribution hypothesis
is consistent with the empirical distributions.
We present a simple model of lumpy investments when there are strategic complemen-
tarity among the firms’ investment decisions. The complementarity stems from the fact
that firms are linked by input and output relations. When a firm has more capital, the
price of the product of the firm is reduced, which gives an incentive to produce more for the
firms that use the product as an input. This model generates a nonnormal distribution with
exponential tail for the fraction of firms that invest in a rational expectations equilibrium.
We take a further step to investigate the empirical evidence of the interdependence
behavior of firms’ investment in the Italian economy. Our empirical investigation results can
be summarized as: first, interaction of small- and medium-size urban centers with traditional
goods production skills directly cultivated entrepreneurship and innovation; second, family-
based agricultural structure that ultimately supplied inexpensive source of labor to the
industries; and third, Catholic and socialist political traditions with a focus on the creation
of a middle class social base.
The model implies that the degree of strategic complementarity across the firms deter-
mines the mean and standard deviation of the exponential distribution for the aggregates.
We investigate this relation by directly estimating the firm’s binary behavior with the same
data. The result is consistent with the model predictions.
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CHAPTER 3
DECOMPOSITION OF DAILY VOLATILITY:
INTRADAY VOLATILITY AND OVERNIGHT SURPRISES
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Measurement of Daily Return and
Volatility
It is a tradition to measure the stock market returns as the log-difference of the closing
prices. Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990) compare the returns
using closing prices with returns using opening prices. Stoll and Whaley show that the
ratio of variance of open-to-open returns to close-to-close returns is consistently greater
than one for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) common stocks during the period 1982
through 1986. They give a number of reasons for the increase in the volatility of open-to-
open returns, such as private information revealed in trading, temporary price deviations
induced by specialists and other traders, and specific trading mechanism at work. Dow
and Gorton (1993) show that different trading mechanisms, such as limit order market,
dealer market, and bargaining and crossing networks market have different impacts on both
variances of open-to-open and close-to-close returns. The news and information flow also
play an important role in explaining asset price volatility. The announcement made when
the market is closed will definitely affect the opening price of the next day’s market. In
this paper we assume that all the information accumulated overnight is reflected in the first
opening price exclusively.
Besides the traditional measurement of daily returns volatility as the variance of log-
difference of closing prices, there are two other popular concepts related to volatility:1 high-
1See Taylor (1987), Ding, Granger, and Engle (1993), and Granger and Sin (2000).
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low spread and realized volatility. The high-low spread refers to the price difference between
the highest and the lowest recorded daily price, and it is a function of the volatility during
the day. Considerable modeling strategies are devoted to improving the daily volatility
forecasting using the high-low spread (Taylor (1987), Chou (1988), and Alizadeh, Brandt,
and Diebold (2002)). Realized volatility is proven to be a consistent estimator of the
quadratic variation of the underlying diffusion process under certain assumptions. One
distinct feature of realized volatility is its use of the regular intraday interval sampling,
which has been proven to be an effective tool in analyzing intraday volatility. The main
differences between these three variables, namely the variance of log-price difference, high-
low spread, and realized volatility, can be summarized as follows: the variance of log-price
difference of daily return utilizes closing prices of the previous day, while the high-low spread
includes all trade information during the day, and the realized volatility focuses on quotes
sampled at discrete intervals during the day.2
This paper uses the log-difference of the closing prices as the measurement of daily
return. We can present the daily return as:
rt = log(Ct)− log(Ct−1)(3.1)
= log(Ct)− log(Ot) + log(Ot)− log(Ct−1)(3.2)
= ct − ot + ot − ct−1(3.3)
= rIt + r
O
t(3.4)
where Ct refers to the closing price at time t, and Ot refers to the opening price at
time t. The lower case letters ct and ot denote the logarithms of the closing and opening
prices, respectively. By adding and subtracting the log of opening prices, we divide the
daily returns into two parts: the intraday return, and overnight return. In this way the
daily return is decomposed into two parts: intraday return, denoted by rIt , and overnight
surprises, denoted by rOt . rIt is defined as the log-difference of the closing price and opening
2Engle and Gallo (2003) give a more detailed discussion on the comparison among these three measure-
ments of daily and intraday volatility.
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price, while rOt represents the log-difference of the price of the previous day’s closing and
today’s opening price. This decomposition is first introduced by Engle, Ito, and Lin (1990)
in the research of spillover effects on volatility of stock indices between Tokyo and NYSE.
The previous studies on intraday volatility have primarily focused on modeling selection
from an econometric standpoint. Among these prior efforts, however, the majority were
devoted to improving the modeling of the intraday return volatility within the aggregate
capital market, and, thus, their conclusion may not be applicable to a certain industry or a
single stock analysis. In addition, very little research of the same nature has been conducted
on the joint analysis of intraday and overnight returns.
This paper starts with analyzing the modeling strategy of intraday volatility. We adopt
a modified GARCH model for high-frequency intraday financial returns originally developed
by Engle and Chanda (2005). By using the High-Frequency Multiplicative Components
GARCH model, we are able to isolate the intraday volatility from interday volatility. Engle’s
original model has two distinct features that are different from other intraday volatility
models. First, the intraday components contain both a deterministic and a stochastic part.
Second, the multiplicative specification of the variance structure generates better statistical
implications. Estimators from the multi-step estimation are consistent and asymptotically
normally distributed. In Engle’s paper, he defines bin as the 10-minute interval during
the day and he excludes the overnight return, which is represented by bin zero in the
model. Our model is different from Engle’s model in two major ways: the first contribution
is the extension of Engle’s model to recover the overnight returns. We believe that the
price change between the previous day’s closing price and today’s opening price conveys
important information in volatility analysis. We apply the model to a single stock and the
entire industry.3 The second contribution is the specification of the intraday price change.
By including all tick-by-tick trade quotes, our model captures more market price change
information compared to the fixed interval categorization.
Section 3 of this paper focuses on the dynamics between intraday and overnight returns
using the sample of top ten most actively traded stocks in three food sectors: the food
3We include the top 20 companies in each industry categorized by market capitalization.
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retailers and wholesalers sector, the restaurant and bars sector, the food products sector
from January 1 to December 31, 2007. Our research results have three main findings: First,
overnight return has marginal impact on intraday return. Second, intraday return has no
explanatory power in analyzing the overnight return. Third, the overnight return of the
food products sector in general is more sensitive to the intraday return than the food retails
and wholesales sector and the restaurant and bars sector based on our sample. We also
study the effects of food recall on the dynamics between intraday and overnight returns for
two specific cases involving two companies in the food products sector.
Since we choose a specific type of news shock to the food industry, we perform an
event study on the food recall in Section 3.4 of this paper. Our purpose is to assess the
economic impact of recalls on the company’s asset returns in the stock market. Using a
data set of food recall announcements during 2007, this study investigates whether there
is evidence of asset return losses associated with recall announcements. The findings of
the event analysis confirm the negative impact of recall announcements on the associated
firms’ stock market returns. Our study also suggests possible insider-trading activities by
examining the behavior of abnormal returns changes around the recall announcement date.
3.1.2 Models of Volatility Forecast
Since Engle’s (1982) seminal paper on ARCH (AutoregressiveConditional Heteroscedas-
ticity) model, financial econometrics literature has been focusing on measuring, modeling,
and forecasting time-varying volatility, which are considered the central issues to asset pric-
ing, portfolio allocation, and risk management. Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2008)
define three different volatility concepts: the notional volatility corresponding to the ex post
sample path return variability over a fixed time interval, the ex ante expected volatility over
a fixed time interval, and the instantaneous volatility corresponding to the strength of the
volatility process at a given point in time. Measurement of return volatility requires de-
composition of a given price movement that represents a return innovation as opposed to
an expected price change. The initial developments are largely parametric, but the recent
literature has moved towards nonparametric approaches. Based on these three different re-
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turn volatility concepts by Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2008), parametric modeling
strategies assume that the expected or instantaneous volatility follow a certain functional
format for both discrete and continuous time stochastic volatility models. So the essential
difference between parametric and nonparametric methods is that the parametric approach
is based on explicit functional form assumptions, while the nonparametric approach is gen-
erally free from such functional form restrictions. Nonparametric approaches are able to
estimate notional volatility that is flexible but consistent when the sampling frequency of
the underlying asset returns increases.
Volatility forecasts are commonly used in a variety of financial market activities. In risk
management, a risk manager will want to know the probability that the investment value
will either appreciate or decline in the future. In derivative pricing and trading, an option
trader is most interested in the volatility involved in the contract today and the potential
change of this volatility in the future life of the contract. In portfolio selection, a portfolio
manager needs to adjust the market positions according to the change of the volatility of
underlying assets in order to meet the preset investment goals. In a market-making case, a
market maker may want to build a larger bid-ask spread to catch the profits if he believes
the market will be more volatile in the future. In general, the study of volatility is valuable
to any market participant whether he wants to hedge the risk of volatility or to profit from
the increased volatility.
However, research on financial time series has long been challenged by the unpre-
dictable feature of future asset prices and returns. Such unpredictability drives research on
the assumption of the linearity of the asset prices time series. Campbell, Lo, and MacKin-
lay (1997) make the distinction between linear time series and nonlinear time series. In
linear time series, shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated but not necessarily identically
independently distributed. In nonlinear time series, shocks are assumed to be identically
independently distributed, but there is a nonlinear function relating the observed time series
and the underlying shocks. However, given the full information on the historic values of the
series, or even the most current available market information, it is still hard to know what
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will happen tomorrow. In econometrics terms this is documented as a martingale difference
process. The term martingale difference process stems from the fact that a process can
always be generated as a difference of a martingale process and in this sense, a martingale
difference process can be thought of as a building block process for a martingale. The cru-
cial statistical property of a martingale difference process is that the conditional mean with
respect to its past is zero. This turns out to be an important assumption in our intraday
volatility model. In recent years there has been a tremendous research, both theoretical and
empirical, devoted to improving the predictability of volatility models. Brock and Hommes
(1997) shows that some degree of predictability is possible when breaking down the sam-
ple period, incorporating new explanatory variables, or using a nonlinear model. White
(2000) suggests a bootstrap-based reality check test to evaluate an out-of-sample forecast
performance.
The most popular approach of forecasting volatility is the class of autoregressive condi-
tional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models originally introduced by Engle (1982). Bera and
Higgins (1993) remark that: “A major contribution of the ARCH literature is the finding
that apparent changes in the volatility of economic time series may be predictable and result
from a specific type of nonlinear dependence rather than exogenous structural changes in
variables.”
In this section, we will review the basic properties and development of the ARCH class
models in volatility prediction.
Let rt be the rate of return of a stock or portfolio from time t−1 to time t. It−1 denotes
the information set available to the investor at time t, which contains all the public market
information and relevant variable values up to time t−1. The expected return and volatility
will be conditioned on the past information set. We define ut and ht as the conditional
expected return and conditional variance of rt, respectively. Thus, ut = E[rt|It−1], and
ht = V ar[rt|It−1]. In this notation, any unpredictable return can be defined as the difference
between rt and ut. We denote the unpredictable return as ξt, which can be interpreted as a
collective measurement of news at time t. So a positive value of ξt implies an upward price
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move, and it can be interpreted as a result of good news in the market, while a negative
value of ξt suggests the release of bad news. Engle (1982) demonstrated that the conditional
variance ht can be modeled as a function of the past values of ξt. The general form of a pth
order ARCH (p) can be expressed as:
(3.5) ht = ω +
p∑
i=1
βiξ
2
t−i,
where i = 1,..., p; β and ω are constants. The parameter β denotes the strength of the
effects of a news shock i period ago on current volatility. The process is nonlinear in
variance but linear in mean. By assuming a declining effect of news impact, we should
expect a declining sequence of value of βi. ξt is the innovation in the asset return. The
ARCH model characterizes the distribution of the stochastic error ξt conditional on the
realized values of the set of variables.
Due to the computational complexity associated with a higher order of the polynomials,
Bollerslev (1986) generalizes the ARCH (p) model to the GARCH model:
(3.6) ht = ω +
p∑
i=1
βiξ
2
t−i +
q∑
i=1
γiht−i.
A GARCH (q,p) has the autoregressive GARCH term of order q, and a moving average
ARCH term of order p. The GARCH (1,1) model implies that the effect of a return shock
on current volatility declines geometrically over time, and Bollerslev (1992) show that it is
preferred in most cases. Bera and Higgins (1993) show that the GARCH models have a set
of desirable features, such as the ability to capture the heavy tails of financial data, and
the simplicity and handling of nonlinearities. We compare the GARCH (1,1) model with
other GARCH models with higher orders of p and q. For details on the comparison among
different GARCH models, see the Appendix section.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the modeling and esti-
mating of intraday volatility using the High-Frequency Multiplicative Component GARCH
model. Section 3 analyzes the interaction between overnight and intraday returns. Sec-
tion 4 uses an event study methodology to examine the economic impact of food recalls on
publicly traded firms asset returns. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 High-Frequency Multiplicative Component
GARCH Model of Intraday Volatility
3.2.1 High Frequency Multiplicative Component
GARCH Model
In this section, we analyze the High-Frequency Multiplicative Component GARCH
model in the intraday volatility analysis. There has been a surge in the literature focusing
on the choice of a volatility model and the criteria of defining a good volatility model. Engle
and Patton (2001) outline some stylized facts about volatility that should be incorporated
in a model. The basic features include pronounced persistence, mean reversion, sign of an
innovation, and exogenous variables distortion.4
In contrast to the extensive research on interday stock market volatility models, the
literature on intraday volatility is still relatively new. The availability of high-frequency
data of the economy stimulates the research in higher frequency econometrics issues and
their application to the economic and financial problems. In both economics and finance,
4The first feature of intraday volatility is persistence. Since the 1960s, research shows that the clustering
of large moves and small moves provides insight into the predictions of the future volatility patterns. Man-
delbrot (1963) and Fama (1965) independently report evidence that large movements of the price of an asset
tend to be followed by large movements, while small changes are often followed by small changes (Baillie
(1996) and Schwert (1989)). The second feature is called mean reverting, which implies that, in general,
there is a normal level of volatility to which volatility will eventually return. This can also be explained
by the volatility clustering. Researchers are centering around the question of how to pick the level of a
normal volatility and what is the real driving force behind this mean reverting. Mean reversion also implies
that current information has no effect on long-term volatility forecasts. The third feature of volatility is
called asymmetric effects of shocks. The shocks to the market can be included in the innovation term of the
volatility model, and many models impose the assumption of asymmetric effects of positive and negative
innovations on the conditional volatility. But the leverage effect or risk premium effect shows contradic-
tory evidence that the sign of the innovation does matter in the predictability of a volatility model. For
example, many researchers (Black (1976), Christie (1982), and Nelson (1991)) find evidence that volatility
is negatively related to equity returns).
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one measurement of progress in empirical research is the frequency of data used, from an-
nual data to monthly data, to weekly data, to daily data, and now to intraday data. Engle
(2000) gives the name ultra-high-frequency data to the limit case where every transaction
is recorded. The research work done on the ultra-high-frequency data gives some new per-
spectives on the concept of volatility. In contrast to the estimation of expected returns,
which generally requires long time records of data, the results of Merton (1980) suggest
that volatility can be estimated arbitrarily well using sufficiently sampled high-frequency
returns over any fixed time interval.5 Data sampled at regular intraday intervals is sum-
marized into a so-called realized volatility. In particular, Andersen and Bollerslev (1997)
show that, under the usual diffusion assumptions, realized volatility computed from high-
frequency intraday returns is effectively a consistent estimator of quadratic variation of
the underlying diffusion process. This notion has gained enormous popularity due to its
error-free volatility measure and simplicity of construction. Realized volatility is simply the
sum of intraperiod high-frequency squared returns period by period. For example, for a
24-hour market, daily realized volatility based on 10-minute underlying returns is defined
as the sum of the 144 intraday squared 10-minute returns on a daily basis.6 Taylor and
Xu (1997) decompose the conditional variance into two elements, the implied volatility and
the realized volatility, using a hourly volatility model under an ARCH specification. The
ARCH specification allows persistence in the variance structure and is proven to be effec-
tive in approximating several return series with similar magnitude cluster in chronological
time. It is also used in explaining the fat tails and spiked peaks of empirical price change
distributions.7 In a seminal paper, Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) construct a 5-minute
volatility model and apply it to a Deutschemark-dollar exchange rate and the S & P 500
index. They examine a multiplicative model of daily and diurnal volatility with an addi-
tional macroeconomic announcement component. Engle (2000) argues that Andersen and
5See, among others, Nelson (1991) and Andersen and Bollerslev (1997).
6However, the data taken at higher frequencies is subject to all sorts of the so-called market microstruc-
ture noises, such as bid-ask bounce (Zhou (1996)), price discreteness, irregular spacing of quotes and trans-
actions, etc.
7See Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), Epps (1976), among others.
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Bollerslev’s approach is not satisfactory for a number of reasons.8 Many research has been
done to capture the existence of long memory to high persistence in the process of volatility,
such as the daily component model by Engle and Lee (1999), the Fractionally Integrated
GARCH (FIGARCH), and Long Memory Stochastic Volatility Models (LMSV) by Breidt
and DeLima (1998). In more recent research, Engle and Gallo (2003) propose to jointly
consider absolute daily returns, daily high-low range, and daily realized volatility to develop
a forecasting model based on their conditional dynamics.
The high-frequency data research not only improves the theoretical understanding of
the econometric theory but also contributes to the practical application of financial models.
For example, investors with liquidity constraints or short-term return targets will be able
to adjust their market positions accordingly based on the prediction of intraday volatility
models. However, even if the growing research on ultra high-frequency data and realized
volatility has shed some light on volatility measurement and forecast, the key issue is to
find appropriate model(s) to characterize the intraday price change and return variations.
In other words, what is of interest is whether daily or other lower frequency models still
generate promising results even when we increase the data sampling frequencies.
To set up the model, we first denote days in the sample by t(t = 1, 2, ..., T ), and each
day is further specified by tick-by-tick data points and indexed by i(i = 0, 1, ...,N ). We
take a new approach which is the tick-by-tick return measurement during the day. Thus,
by definition the intraday return can be presented as:
(3.7) rI(t,i) = log
P(t,i)
P(t,i−1)
,
where i = 1, 2,..., N.
Traditionally, return is calculated based on a preset interval, or referred to as bin, of
8For details, see Engle and Patton (2001)
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either a 5- or 10-minute interval.9 However, our proposition is that such a regular interval
division leads to biased and incomplete information due to a loss of data. The total number
of observations in our sample is 20,906, which contains the tick-by-tick return on each
trading day from 9:30 a.m. untill 4:00 p.m. EST during the month of March 2007.10 The
advantage of including every trade quote is to recover full market information and helps us
better understand the behavior of investors.
We specify the intraday return as the square root of the multiplicative product of
daily return, diurnal return, and stochastic intraday return. Thus, the conditional variance
can be decomposed into a multiplicative product of daily, diurnal, and stochastic intraday
volatility. We use the following notation to denote intraday returns:
(3.8) rI(t,i) =
√
htdtq(t,i)ε(t,i),
where ht is the daily variance component, dt is the diurnal variance component after deflat-
ing the return by the daily volatility, q(t,i) is the stochastic intraday volatility component
with mean equal to one, and ε(t,i) is an error term that is assumed to follow the standard
normal distribution.
3.2.2 Empirical Estimation
Unlike the abundance of past literature that has examined the modeling strategy on
intraday volatility, there has been very little research attention devoted to the empirical
application of those theoretical models. In this section we will discuss data sampling and
the estimation process of the High-Frequency Multiplicative Component GARCH model.
Transactions data can be characterized by two random variables: the time of the transaction,
and the observation at that time of the transaction. In point processes literature, the point
of time is referring to the time when a contract to trade a certain number of shares of a
9Engle chose a 10-minute interval for the bin size. The literature shows that a 5-minute interval generally
outperforms other interval sizes. In Engle’s paper he named the variance within each bin after deflating the
daily effects as diurnal (calendar) components.
10If the data are sampled at 10-minute intervals, the size of the sample decreases to 40 records per day
and 880 data points in total. Another common practice in empirical high-frequency data research is to use
5-minute intervals, which gives a total of 80 data points per day and 1,760 in total for March 2007.
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stock is agreed upon; and the observations are usually called marks, which may include the
volume of the contract, the price of the contract, and the posted bid and ask prices. For
the purpose of this paper, we use the consolidated trades data from the trade and quote
(TAQ) database in the intraday volatility analysis.11
For daily data we use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.12
For the High-Frequency Multiplicative Component GARCH model, we select Sara Lee
Corporation (Ticker: SLE). Based in Downers Grove, Illinois, the Sara Lee Corporation
(SLE) is a global manufacturer and marketer of high-quality, brand-name products for con-
sumers throughout the world. Sara Lee’s businesses include fresh bakeries, and household
body care throughout North America and around the globe.
Figure 3.1 plots price, volume, and return charts of SLE during the trading days from
March 1 to March 31, 2007. The price chart shows that the price of the stock is more volatile
during the second half of the day, especially during the market closing period. When we
consider the price chart and volume chart together, we notice that the two spikes of the
volume happened after the stock price touched the two lowest points during the month.
This might serve as an indication of the investors trying to take advantage of the lower
cost of the shares. The largest volume, 1,066,800 shares, happened on March 16 at 9:30:20
at the price of $16.64. The second largest trading, 621,500 shares, traded on March 5 at
16:02:50 at the price of $16.42, after the stock price hit the lowest level at $16.17 at 10:02:27
on March 5. The third largest trading happened on March 16 at 16:02:50 at the price of
11The trade and quote (TAQ) database contains intraday transactions data (trades and quotes) for all
securities listed on the NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX), as well as NASDAQ National Market
System (NMS) and Small Cap issues. In microstructure models, trades may reflect private information that
is then incorporated into new quotes and the following trades. A trade is a transaction price when a
deal is agreed uponbetween counterparties. A quote reflects a market participant’s willingness to trade.
In financial markets, traders buy and sell assets and specialists post quotes. Traders observe the quotes
and previous trades to determine their trading strategies and the new trades. Similarly, specialists observe
previous quotes to decide what quotes to post. Engle and Lunde (2003) examine speed of the information
flow between trades and quotes using a bivariate point process. They find that prices respond more quickly
to trades when information is flowing and the price impacts of trades are high in such circumstances. This
paper chooses trades and excludes quotes in the database.
12CRSP is a research center at the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago. It
maintains the most comprehensive collection of security price, return, and volume data for the NYSE,
AMEX and NASDAQ stock markets. Founded in 1960 by James H. Lorie and Lawrence Fisher, professors
at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, CRSP was set up in order to advance research
in operations of security markets. It is the first organization to have compiled accurate and computerized
information, and to have made the data available to academic and commercial markets.
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FIGURE 3.1
Tick-by-Yick Price, Volume, and Return of SLE
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TABLE 3.1
Descriptive Statistics for Price, Return, and Volume
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Median Kurtosis Skewness
Price 20,906 16.54 .138 16.17 17.03 16.54 .946 .757
Return 20,905 .000 .000 -.008 .008 .000 22.996 -.383
Volume 20,906 675.289 6619.478 100.000 621,500.000 200.000 7268.401 80.248
$16.61. Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of these three variables, price, volume,
and return. As expected, we can see that when every trade is recorded, the variation in
returns decreases dramatically.
We take a three-step approach to decompose intraday equity returns into three compo-
nents, daily variance, diurnal variance, and intraday variance. In the first step we estimate
the daily volatility component, ht. The most popular approach of forecasting daily volatility
is the class of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models originally in-
troduced by Engle (1982). Bollerslev (1992) provide a nice survey of the ARCH and related
models applied to financial time-series. After the original ARCH model introduced in 1982
by Engle, Bollerslev (1986) generalizes the ARCH (p) model into the GARCH (p,q) model:
(3.9) ht = ω +
p∑
i=1
βiε
2
t−1 +
q∑
i=1
γiht−i,
where ω, α, and β are constant parameters. The survey by Bollerslev (1992) shows that the
GARCH(1,1) is preferred in most research. GARCH (1,1) is the simplest form that assumes
a geometrically decline of the effect of a return shock on current volatility over time. In
this case, the estimated daily variance term is:
(3.10) hˆt = ω + βε2(t−1) + γh(t−1).
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In the second step, we estimate the diurnal variance component, dt. Based on the
multiplicative component form of the daily volatility model, we have:
r2(t,i)
ht
= dtq(t,i)ε2(t,i)(3.11)
E[
r2(t,i)
ht
] = dtE[q(t,i)](3.12)
E[
r2(t,i)
ht
] = dt(3.13)
given assumption that the mean of stochastic volatility, E[q(t,i)], equals to one. Let
(3.14) y(t,i) =
r(t,i)√
hˆt
=
√
dtq(t,i)ε(t,i),
then the diurnal component can be estimated as the variance of y(t,i) on day t, which is
denoted as:
(3.15) dˆt =
1
T
T∑
t=1
y2(t,i), i = 1, 2, ...,N.
In the final step we estimate the stochastic intraday volatility using a GARCH(1,1)
model. Let:
(3.16) z(t,i) =
r(t,i)√
hˆtdˆt
,
which is the normalized daily return after deflating by daily return and diurnal return.
Given the assumptions on conditional moments
(3.17) zt,i | It,i−1 ∼ N (0, q(t,i)),
where It,i−1 represents all the information available up to the current moment at tick i on
day t. The estimated intraday volatility can be estimated from a standard GARCH(1,1)
53
model:
(3.18) ˆq(t,i) = ω + βiz2(t,i−1) + γiq(t,i−1).
The daily variance component, ht, can be estimated in many different ways. Engle
and Gallo (2003) used a daily realized variance approach. Engle and Chanda (2005) utilize
commercially available volatility forecasts produced daily. Andersen and Bollerslev (1997)
propose a daily GARCH model for monthly data. The daily return data contain the daily
return for SLE each day in March from 1947 to 2007. The daily variance is calculated using
a GARCH (1,1) model. Our research shows that GARCH (1,1) model outperforms other
GARCH models. For a detailed comparison, see Table A.1 in the Appendix. The estimation
result of the model is:
(3.19) hˆt = 0.000− 0.191ε2(t−1)+ 1.163h(t−1).
The ARCH term, ε2(t−1), represents news about volatility from the previous period,
and the GARCH term, h(t−1), shows last period’s forecast variance. In a financial context,
an agent or trader predicts the current period’s variance by forming a weighted average
of three terms: a long-term average, the forecasted variance from the last period, and
information about volatility observed in the previous period. The estimated parameter of
h(t−1) indicates a persistent impact of last period’s forecast variance and is consistent with
the volatility clustering often seen in financial returns data, where large changes in returns
are likely to be followed by further large changes.
The diurnal component,dt, is calculated in a different way from the Engle (1982)’s
method. Since we use the tick-by-tick data without dividing the data into fixed intervals,
we calculate the variance of returns on each day after deflating by the daily volatility.
After normalizing returns by daily and diurnal volatility components, we model the
residual volatility as a GARCH (1,1) process.
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Table 3.2 summarizes the estimation results of the daily and diurnal variance compo-
nents of the High-Frequency Multiplicative Component GARCH model. Table 3.3 shows
the estimation results for the intraday component of the GARCH model after filtering out
daily and diurnal results. Our research finds that GARCH (1,1) model has a better perfor-
mance compared to other GARCH specifications. For a detailed comparison see Appendix
Table A.2. The estimate of β for the GARCH model is .093, with a standard error of .002,
and estimate for γ is .843, with a standard error of .004. This indicates a strong relation
between last period’s forecast variance and the estimate of volatility for this period’s vari-
ance. To assess the persistence implied by the GARCH model, it is useful to consider the
sum of β and γ, which must be less than 1.0 for the volatility process to be stationary. This
sum equals .969 for the March 2007 sample period for Sara Lee stock.
We apply a similar procedure at the industry level during the same time period. Tables
3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the intraday volatility analysis results for three sectors: food retails
and wholesales, restaurants and bars, and food products in three exchanges: NYSE, Pacific
Exchange, and NASDAQ.13 The persistence parameters are .983, .988, and .957, for the
Food Retailers and Wholesalers, Restaurants and Bars, and Food Products sectors, respec-
tively. This shows that even after removing the daily volatility component, the intraday
volatility component still demonstrates a long persistence.14 Estimation results show that
stocks listed in NYSE have a higher estimation for γ, which is the persistence parameter for
last period’s forecast volatility, than stocks listed in the other two stock exchanges, Pacific
and NASDAQ. But for the estimation of β, the estimation on the news about volatility
from the previous period, there is no clear pattern as to which exchange yields a better
estimation results. The estimation results on the summation of β and γ show that in the
food retails and wholesales sector, and restaurant and bars sector, the NYSE group also
13The Industry Classification Benchmark is comprised of 10 industries, 18 supersectors, 39 sectors and
104 subsectors. Food products is a subsector of food producers under the supersector food and beverage in
the consumer goods industry. Food retailers and wholesalers is a subsector of food and drug retailers under
retails supersector in the consumer services industry. Restaurants and bars is a subsector in the travel and
leisure sector under the travel and leisure supersector in the consumer services industry.
14The family of GARCH models is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The log-likelihood
function is computed from the product of all conditional densities of the prediction errors.
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TABLE 3.2
Estimation Results of Daily Variance and
Diurnal Variance Components for SLE
Date hˆt dˆt
20070301 8.36E-05 0.00224
20070302 8.31E-05 0.00259
20070305 8.65E-05 0.00233
20070306 8.58E-05 0.00189
20070307 8.61E-05 0.00231
20070308 8.46E-05 0.00272
20070309 8.32E-05 0.00259
20070312 8.54E-05 0.00186
20070313 8.39E-05 0.00370
20070314 8.88E-05 0.00364
20070315 8.82E-05 0.00391
20070316 8.84E-05 0.00502
20070319 8.67E-05 0.00325
20070320 8.51E-05 0.00273
20070321 8.47E-05 0.00401
20070322 8.54E-05 0.00346
20070323 8.39E-05 0.00444
20070326 8.23E-05 0.00471
20070327 8.08E-05 0.00489
20070328 7.95E-05 0.00857
20070329 7.83E-05 0.00601
20070330 7.72E-05 0.00863
TABLE 3.3
Estimation Results of Intraday
Component for SLE
Parameters Estimates
ω 0.064**
(.002)
β .093**
(.002)
γ .843**
(.004)
β + γ .969
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TABLE 3.4
Estimation Results of Intraday Component for the Food Retailers and Wholesalers Sector
NYSE Pacific NASDAQ
ω .000 .000 .000
(.000) (.001) (.000)
β .166** .258** .190**
(.002) (.021) (.003)
γ .817** .679** .761**
(.001) (.000) (.002)
β + γ .983 .937 .951
TABLE 3.5
Estimation Results of Intraday Component for the Restaurant and Bars Sector
NYSE Pacific NASDAQ
ω .000 .000 .000
(.000) (.000) (.001)
β .182** .256** .240**
(.001) (.022) (.001)
γ .806** .702** .732**
(.020) (.001) (.003)
β + γ .988 .958 .972
TABLE 3.6
Estimation Results of Intraday Component for the Food Products Sector
NYSE Pacific NASDAQ
ω .000 .000 .000
(.000) (.002) (.001)
β .234** .249** .271**
(.006) (.023) (.001)
γ .713** .702** .644**
(.001) (.002) (.002)
β + γ .947 .951 .915
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reports a stronger persistence than the other two stock exchanges. This can be explained
by the size and market depth of the exchanges.
One of the major improvements of the ARCH and GARCH models is to incorporate
the so-called leverage or asymmetric effect to capture the effects of news shock in time series
data. The leverage or asymmetric effect is first introduced by Black (1976) and confirmed by
French and Stambaugh (1987), Nelson (1991), and Schwert (1990). In ARCH and GARCH
models, it is assumed that good news and bad news affect the predictable volatility in a
similar way. But empirical results show that such a symmetry constraint on the conditional
variance function in past ε’s is inappropriate. This is because empirical research shows that
there is a larger effect on the predictable volatility when a negative shock occurs due to bad
news compared to a positive shock associated with good news. The so-called “asymmetric”
or “leverage” volatility models are introduced to address the issue of different predictability
for future volatility due to good news and bad news. So far most research focuses on
interday volatility changes associated with this asymmetric effect.15
3.3 Interaction Between Intraday Return and
Overnight Return
3.3.1 Information and Volatility
As we discussed in the introduction, overnight return is defined as the log-price differ-
ence between the previous day’s closing price and today’s opening price. Some researchers
argue that the volatility feature is interrupted due to the flow of information released when
the market is closed. The effect of news on the price change are different during the trading
time and the closing time.16 The overnight return captures the accumulated information
effects on market prices when the equity market is closed. That is:
(3.20) rO(t,i) = log
Ot
Ct−1
, t = 1, 2, ..., T.
15See the first systematic comparison of volatility model by Pagan and Schwert(1990), Exponential
GARCH model by Nelson (1991), and Engle (2000), among others.
16See Romer (1993), Dow and Gorton (1993).
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Measuring and testing the news impact on volatility abound in recent years, especially
in macroeconomics and finance. Both theoretical approaches and empirical applications are
aimed at improving the volatility predictability in the presence of news. 17 The fist part of
this section discusses about the effects between information and return volatility, and the
second part utilizes a linear model to study the dynamics between overnight return and
intraday return.
The link between information and prices is a popular subject of the finance literature.
Researchers find the power of public information and order flow in explaining the price
volatility. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) propose a model where prices convey information
flow from the informed to the uninformed. When informed individuals obtain positive news
about a certain stock, they post a higher bid, and the price of that stock increases. So the
price system makes the information previously owned by the informed investors publicly
available to the uninformed. Based on Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) research, Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) extend the contents of order flow to include both public and private
information, as well as market shocks from either rational or irrational trades.18 In general,
the deviation of the stock price from its fundamental value is a result of information effects,
rational and irrational investor behavior, and other market microstructure frictions.
One focus of this paper is to analyze trading versus nontrading period stock market
return. Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek (2006) summarize the major challenges in this area: the
endogeneity of the information generation process (i.e., the mix of information-driven price
17The so-called “asymmetric” or “leverage” volatility models take into account the different predictabil-
ity for future volatility between good news and bad news. Pagan and Schwert (1990) introduce the first
comparison of volatility models with an emphasis on the asymmetric effect of positive and negative news on
volatility. Further, research led by Engle and Ng (1993) provides news diagnostic tests and a nonparametric
model for uncovering the relations between news and volatility and how to interpret the difference among
different volatility models. In a classic paper by Gallo, he refers to the price change at opening time as
transitory volatility and claims that this volatility declines during the day. This finding is also confirmed
by other researcher. See Mitchell and Mulherin (1994), Stoll and Whaley (1990), among others. In Gallo’s
paper, he is particularly interested in the question as to whether the close-to-open (overnight returns) has a
statistically significant impact on the open-to-close (intraday returns). The investigation of overnight sur-
prises is of particular interest for trading in segmented markets. A growing number of literature has shown
that there is an asymmetry of behavior originating from two different sources: one from the accumulation
of news during the close hours, and the other from the news released when the market is open and active
trading is available.
18Rational trades refer to the noninformation-based liquidity trades, and irrational trades are trades
based on market noise. See Black (1976).
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adjustment and price error), inability to observe the investors’ motivation, and multieffects
of market structure. Dow and Gorton (1993) claim that the trading process itself is the
mechanism for information exchange, and stock return variances are higher during trading
hours than during nontrading hours, and longer trading hours are associated with higher
trading volume (Oldfield and Rogalski (1980), French and Roll (1986), Meese and Rose
(1991)). Recent empirical work suggests that the arrival of new information and the price
change may not follow a clear pattern. For example, Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1991)
find that even the largest daily price changes cannot be associated with any significant
market news, especially at the individual firm level, where private information takes a larger
role in price change. Berry and Keith (1991) study the number of news items released by
Reuter’s News Service as proxies for the public information flow, and results show little
evidence of such information in explaining the variation of daily volatility. As pointed
out by Goodhart and O’Hara (1997), the private information-based explanation for the
volatility behavior should be able to address the empirical return volatility issue within the
trading day, within the trading week, and over off-trading periods as well. So far most
of the empirical work has studied the interdaily volatility pattern, the intraday volatility
pattern, and the announcements in isolation (Andersen and Bollerslev (1997)). Andersen
and Bollerslev (1997) take a step in this direction and perform a comprehensive study of
the volatility process in the DeutscheMark-dollar foreign exchange market based on a one-
year sample of 5-minute returns using Reuters interbank quotes data. Their research finds
that the largest returns appear to be linked to the release of public information, especially
certain macroeconomic announcements, namely the employment reports, gross domestic
product, trade balance figures and other news related to the real economy. However, the
explanatory power is less evident at the lower frequency level. Given the fast development
of communication channels and tools, it is difficult to pin down the time regarding to a
specific news release. In this paper we distinguish the news release between the time period
when the market is open and when the market is closed. Based on our literature survey,
our research is among the pioneer work in exploring the effects of recall news on the food
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industry stock price change.
Another implication of the effects of information on volatility is the intraday U-shaped
pattern.19 The source of the intraday U-shaped pattern has been extensively studied in
volatility research. An explanation for the intraday U-shaped volatility pattern falls into
two categories: asymmetric information, and market structure. The first argument says
that private or asymmetric information is the central factor as investors optimize their
trading portfolio return while minimizing the trading costs and market uncertainties. The
second argument focuses on the impact of market structure, claiming that the intraday
patterns occur because of a long-term horizon of the strategic behavior of the investor.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggest that the trading clustering at the opening and closing
of trading is due to the asymmetric information about the future cash flows of a stock.
Their central argument is that volume patterns are due to the simultaneous trading of
both informed and uninformed investors with the intention to minimize the transaction
costs. Brock and Hommes (1997) generalize the case where investors can have different
optimal holding portfolios when the market is closed from the case of when the market is
open. Their research shows that it is the periodic market closure that attributes to the
U-shaped pattern. They argue that the demand for trading at the open and close of the
market is relatively strong and inelastic compared to the interday as traders try to optimize
investment portfolios and diversify overnight risks. Brock and Kleidon’s work is based on
the assumption of some degree of monopoly power of market makers. When the market
opens and before they can estimate the true price level of the stock, market makers tend
to construct a wide bid-ask spread so they will not be adversely selected by those who
possess more information. As the market approaches closing, market makers maintain wide
bid-ask spreads in order to minimize their excess exposure to the risk of holding unwanted
inventories when the market shuts down.
In general, there are two causes that lead to the U-shaped intraday volatility pattern.
First, investors want to rebalance their portfolio when the market states change between
19The U-shaped pattern is also referred to as the reverse J-shaped or the intraday “smile” pattern.
Literature shows that this pattern exists in intraday price, volume, and returns.
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closing and opening. Second, investors are constantly reevaluating their positions when
facing and competing with both informed and uninformed traders. Research also shows
that order flow is a major component of the transmission mechanism from information to
prices.20 In this paper, our analysis, based on the intraday stock price of the food sectors,
reveals a J-curve intraday price pattern instead of a U-shaped one.
3.3.2 Dynamics of Intraday Return and
Overnight Surprises
Market volatility has been found to be higher during the trading rather than the non-
trading hours (French and Roll (1986), Amihud and Mendelson (1987), and Wood, McInish,
and Ord (1985)). In this section we will focus on the issue of the dynamic relationship be-
tween the intraday return and overnight surprises. Research shows that overnight surprises
have an impact on the intraday conditional variance and mean. But our research on the
food sector data during the year of 2007 does not reveal such a relationship in general except
for the food products sector. This paper also studies whether yesterday’s intraday return
volatility has a “hang-over” effect on the overnight return volatility. The impact of food
recall is related to event studies in Finance and Economics. Since Dolley (1933)’s research
on the price effects of stock splits, event studies have improved both in terms of method-
ology and empirical applications. In the late 1960s, Ball and Brown (1969) applied the
event study methodology in the case of information content of earnings, and Fama (1965)
introduced the modern event study methodology and used it in the effects of stock splits.
It provides further information on the interaction between the trading hour return and the
nontrading hour return.21
20Brown and Warner (1985) find that the order flow on the NYSE follows a U-shaped intraday pattern.
Lee and Liu (2001) show that the clustering of trading at the open and close of trading can be found in both
informed and uninformed traders in the Taiwan stock exchange
21The arguments of Fama (1965) form the theoretical foundation for the Efficient Market Hypothesis,
which reasons that in an efficient and active market consisting of many well-informed investors, equity
prices will appropriately reflect the effects of information based on present and future expected events. The
cornerstone of the improvement is the separation of common shocks or confounding events out of the general
stock market price movements. Other modifications are related to adjustments in the experimental design
to accommodate the violation of statistical assumptions and to include more specific hypotheses. This paper
focuses on the dynamics between overnight and intraday return.
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Using a simple least-square estimation, we have:
rIt,i = a1 + b1r
O
t + ξt(3.21)
rOt = a2 + b2r
I
t−1,i + ηt.(3.22)
In the estimation process, we choose the top ten most actively traded stocks in three
food-related sectors from January 1 to December 31, 2007. First, we estimate the effects of
overnight return on the intraday return for each of the three sectors.
Contrary to most research results, the OLS estimation results do not suggest a strong
relation between the overnight and the intraday returns in general. Table 3.7 shows the
sample estimation results for the food retailers and wholesalers sector. Except for one
company, United Natural (UNFI), that demonstrates a negative impact of the overnight
return on intraday return, the rest of the ten actively traded firms does not show a strong
relation between the previous day’s overnight return and the next day’s intraday return.
The parameter estimate shows that when there is a 1% increase in the overnight return, the
intraday return will decrease by .542%. Table 3.8 shows the results for the restaurant and
bars sector. We find mixed results for firms that indicate an explanatory relation between
the overnight and intraday returns. Starbucks (SBUX), McDonalds (MCD), and Burger
King Holdings, Inc. (BKC) indicate a negative impact of overnight return on intraday
return, while Darden Restaurant (DRI) shows a positive effect of the overnight return on
the intraday return. The negative relation for SBUX can be interpreted in the same way as
the stock for UNFI. The positive estimation result on DRI shows that when the overnight
return increased by 1%, the intraday return will increased by .262%. Interestingly, in the
food products sector, which is reported in Table 3.9, we find that over one-half of the firms
are responsive to the overnight return. Among the top ten most actively traded firms,
Kraft Foods Inc (KFT), Conagra Foods (CAG), SaraLee Corporation (SLE), Smithfield
Foods (SFD), HJ Heinz (HNZ), and Pilgrim’s Pride (PPC) show a strong negative relation
between overnight and intraday returns. This result indicates that a positive overnight
return has a negative impact on the intraday return. The negative relationship can be
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TABLE 3.7
Estimation Results of Overnight Return Effects for
the Food Retailers and Wholesalers Sector
KR SYY SWY SVU WFMI RDK CASY WMK GAP UNFI
a1 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 -.001 .001 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)
b1 .054 -.280 -.127 .163 .145 .154 -.053 .216 -.176 -.542**
(.105) (.121) (.129) (.132) (.132) (.136) (.107) (.161) (.128) (.149)
TABLE 3.8
Estimation Results of Overnight Return Effects for
the Restaurant and Bars Sector
SBUX MCD YUM DRI CAKE EAT SONC BKC RT TXRH
a1 -.002 .001 .000 .000 -.002 .000 -.002 .000 .001 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
b1 -.275** -.257** -.026 .262** -.036 -.013 .212* -.350** .123* .023
(.088) (.113) (.019) (.082) (.092) (.132) (.111) (.125) (.070) (.111)
interpreted to show that the return pattern could reverse overnight based on our sample.
Next we analyze the effect of previous day’s intraday return on the overnight return in
these three food sectors. The OLS estimation results are reported in Tables 3.10, 3.11, and
3.12. Our empirical results in general do not indicate a strong relation between these two
variables. However, in the food retailers and wholesalers sector, except for two stocks, Super
Value Inc (SVU), Casey’s General (CASY), and United Natural (UNFI), which show a neg-
TABLE 3.9
Estimation Results of Overnight Return Effects for
the Food Products Sector
KFT ADM CAG SLE TSN SFD GIS HNZ BG PPC
a1 .000 .000 -.001 .000 -.001 .000 .000 .000 -.005 -.003
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002)
b1 -.485** -.036 -.321** -.448** -.163* -.276 -.186* -.316 -.062 -.314**
(.135) (.094) (.097) (.111) (.086) (.134) (.106) (.106) (.059) (.130)
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TABLE 3.10
Estimation Results of Intraday Return Effects for
the Food Retailers and Wholesalers Sector
KR SYY SWY SVU WFMI RDK CASY WMK GAP UNFI
a2 .000 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .001 .001 .000 .000 -.001
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001)
b2 -.022 .033 .016 -.064** -.057 -.045 -.082** -.021 .015 -.058**
(.038) (.033) (.031) (.030) (.036) (.029) (.037) (.025) (.031) (.026)
TABLE 3.11
Estimation Results of Intraday Return Effects for
the Restaurant and Bars Sector
SBUX MCD YUM DRI CAKE EAT SONC BKC RT TXRH
a2 .001 .001 -.002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .001 .001
(.001) (.000) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
b2 .054 -.078** .199 -.038 -.002 -.073** -.001 .010 .050 -.066*
(.105) (.035) (.210) (.048) (.044) (.030) (.036) (.032) (.058) (.036)
ative relation between intraday and overnight returns, the rest of the top ten actively traded
stocks do not show a significant relationship. Similar results are found in the restaurant
and bars sector, where only two firms, McDonals (MCD) and Sonic Corporation (SONC),
show a negative impact of the previous day’s intraday return on the overnight return. In
the food products sector, Kraft Foods (KFT) and Conagra Foods (CAG) yield a negative
relation between the previous day’s intraday return and the overnight return.
Our research does not find a significant interaction effect between overnight and intra-
day returns based on the most actively traded stocks and FDA (Food and Drug Administra-
TABLE 3.12
Estimation Results of Intraday Return Effects for
the Food Products Sector
KFT ADM CAG SLE TSN SFD GIS HNZ BG PPC
a2 .000 .001 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002
(.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.002) (.001)
b2 -.114** .005 -.103** .000 -.074 -.013 -.052 -.051 -.087 -.011
(.028) (.043) (.040) (.035) (.046) (.030) (.038) (.037) (.068) (.031)
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TABLE 3.13
Estimation Results of Overnight Return Effects for
the Tyson Company and Kraft Foods Global Company
Estimate TSN KFT
a1 .002 .001
(.003) (.003)
b1 -0.405 -.310
(.443) (0.423)
tion) recall data. This may serve as a symptom that overnight news or surprises do not have
a significant impact on the price change when the market is open. Finally, we investigate
the effects of USDA food recall cases and their impacts on two specific companies involved
in the food recall cases. The first recall is Tyson Fresh Meats Company’s recall of 16,743
pounds of ground beef that may be contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 on March 2, 2007.
Tyson’s voluntary recall is a Class I recall and health risk is high. The second recall is
Kraft Foods Global, Inc’s recall of approximately 1,800 pounds of bacon due to insufficient
cooling during processing. Kraft’s voluntary recall is a Class II recall and health risk is low.
The time span is five days before and five days after the recall for each firm. For Tyson,
the data window is from Feb. 26 to March 9 and for Kraft, the time frame is March 21 to
April 2. First, we analyze the effects of overnight return on the intraday return. The results
in Table 3.13 show a negative impact of the overnight return on the intraday return but
the value of the impact is statistically significant. Table 3.14 indicates a negative relation
between the previous day’s intraday and overnight returns for TSN stock and a positive
relation for KFT stock. However, both of these two effects are statistically insignificant.
3.4 An Event Study of Food Recall
The impact of food recall is receiving growing interest in financial and agricultural
literature. A number of studies have examined the effect of food recall. In order to commerce
our investigation of the food recall event analysis, we would like to provide some of its
background information. A recall is an effective method of removing from commerce any
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TABLE 3.14
Estimation Results of Intraday Return Effects for
the Tyson Company and Kraft Foods Global Company
Estimate TSN KFT
a2 .000 -.000
(.001) (.001)
b2 -.112 .031
(.079) (.068)
product that may be adulterated or misbranded. The Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS) within the USDA gives the following definition of a food recall: “A food recall is a
voluntary action by a manufacturer or distributor to protect the public from products that
may cause health problems or possible death.” FSIS inspects and regulates meat, poultry,
and processed egg products produced in federally inspected plants. FSIS is responsible
to make sure that these products are safe, wholesome, and accurately labeled. The other
food recall regulation agency in the United State is the Department of Health and Human
Services’ FDA. FDA regulates food, pet, and farm animal feed.
Recalls are generally initiated by the manufacturer or distributor of meat, poultry, and
processed egg products, sometimes at the request of FSIS. Under the current FSIS regula-
tion, all recalls are voluntary, and firms such as a manufacturer, distributor, or importer,
take these actions as part of their responsibility to protect the public’s health and welfare.
But if a company refuses to recall its products in the case of a recall accident, then FSIS
has the legal authority to detain and seize those products in commerce.22
Our purpose is to assess the economic impact of recalls on a company’s asset returns
in the stock market. Measuring the overall effect of recall on stock return is problematic,
and a direct measurement of the impact of a recall on a firm’s profitability or stock price is
impossible. In addition, because the recall accrues over time, current stock price may not
22According to the FSIS recall regulation policy, there are four primary causes that will bring the atten-
tion of FSIS on meat and poultry products: products with potential hazard reported by the manufactures
or distributors; adulterated or misbranded products discovered by the FSIS sampling program; unsafe or
improperly labeled foods in the course of routine duties of FSIS field inspectors; unsafe, unwholesome, or
inaccurately labeled food submitted by state or local public health departments.
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accurately reflect the true economic impact of a given recall announcement. This difficulty
drives us to use an alternative measure, which is the abnormal return of a firm in the case
of a recall. This event study methodology is widely used in a variety of disciplines, such
as finance, accounting, marketing, law, and organizational behavior. Event study measures
the magnitude of the effect that an unexpected event has on the expected return and risk
of a firm or firms associated with that particular event. Based on the Efficient Market
Hypothesis,23 the price of a stock is the present value of a firm’s expected cash flows at
any given time and it reflects all the current available information about the firm’s present
and future earnings potential. Under the assumption of the Effective Market Hypothesis,
the stock price changes as soon as the market receives any new information resulting from
an unexpected event. Brown and Warner (1985) argue that the amount of change in the
price of a stock after an event, relative to its pre-event price, would reflect the unbiased
market estimate of the economic value of that event. Abnormal return is used to measure
the change in stock price after adjustment for normal market movements.
The daily returns of an individual stock i are calculated as:
(3.23) Ri,t = ln(Pi,t+1)− ln(Pi,t)
(3.24) Rm,t = ln(Pm,t+1)− ln(Pm,t),
where Pi,t and Pm,t represent the closing price for stock i and the S&P 500 index on day t,
respectively. We use the same method in calculating market index returns. To calculate the
abnormal returns for each firm in the event period, we use the market model by MacKinlay
(1997). The return for any stock i on day t is:
(3.25) Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + εi,t
23See Fama (1965) for more details.
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where Ri,t and Rm,t represent the returns on stock i and market index return on day t,
respectively. For our research purposes, the event day is the date when the announcement
of a recall is first released from the FDA or USDA.24
Let τ be used to index returns throughout the event period, where τ = 0 represents
the event day, τ = t1 to τ = t0 constitutes the estimation window, and τ = t2 to τ = t1
is defined as the event window. So by definition, T1 = t1 − t0 represents the estimation
window and T2 = t2 − t1 denotes the event window. In order to reduce bias for the impact
of the food recall event, the estimation window is chosen as the 60 days prior to the event
window. The estimated abnormal return is:
(3.26) ARi,τ = Ri,τ − (αˆi + βˆiRm,τ ),
where ARi,τ is the difference between the actual return and estimated return. αˆi and βˆi
are estimated using the ordinary least square method as follows:
(3.27) αˆi = µˆi − βˆiµˆm
(3.28) βˆi =
∑t1
τ=t0
(Ri,τ − µˆi)∑t1
τ=t0
(Rm,τ − µˆm)2
(3.29) σˆ2εi =
1
t1 − 1
t1∑
τ=t0
(Ri,τ − αˆi − βˆiRm,τ)2.
24The FSIS recalls in 2007 is available from FSIS Recall Case Archive website: http :
//www.fsis.usda.gov/fsisrecalls/RecallCaseArchive2007/index.asp. The FDA recalls in 2007 is published
from its website: http : //www.fda.gov/oc/po/firmrecalls/archive2007.html.
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The average abnormal return for N events during event period τ is:
(3.30) AARτ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARi,τ .
The cumulative average abnormal returns are calculated as the averaging over the event
window, T2:
(3.31) CAARt1,t2 =
t2∑
τ=t1
AARτ .
We tested the statistical significance of CAAR using the null hypothesis that the abnormal
returns are significantly different from zero. The t-statistic is calculated as:
(3.32) tCAARt1,t2 =
CAARt1,t2√
CAARt1,t2
.
Following MacKinlay’s (1997) study, we estimated the parameters of the market model
(α and β in Equation 3.25) for each firm by regressing its actual returns on the returns of
S & P 500 index during the same estimation period of 60 days prior to the event window.
The estimated market model parameters, αˆ and βˆ, are used to calculate abnormal returns.
The stock portfolio is composed of 17 firms for 18 FDA food recalls and 5 firms for 7 USDA
food recalls during 2007.25 The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for days ±
22 for FDA and USDA recalls are shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 presents the average abnormal returns for the recall announcements on the
event day, as well as for an event window of ± 22 days around the event day. Results show
that, on average, announcements of food recall are associated with negative excess returns in
the stock market. The CAAR for both FDA and USDA recall announcements demonstrate
25We chose the recalls between January to November 2007 due to the availability of data. Only those
firms that are publicly traded in the NYSE or NASDAQ are selected. The sample in our study consists of
18 out of 384 FDA recalls and 7 out of 54 USDA recalls during 2007. There are two reasons for the limit of
our sample size: first, over 60% of the firms associated with food recalls are private firms; and second, about
40% of the recall announcements are general health and safety warnings and no specific company names are
mentioned. For a complete list of the sample size and recall case description, see Tables A.3, A.4, A.5, and
A.6. Our sample in FDA recalls also include four cases of nonfood recalls.
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FIGURE 3.2
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for FDA
and USDA Recalls (± 22 Days)
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FIGURE 3.3
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for FDA
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a clear pattern of negative movement of stock returns. A return run-down is evident as early
as day -10 for USDA recalls and return decreases almost 4% on the announcement date.
The trends of CAAR for FDA depict a more informative picture of downturn movement
prior to the events. Stock returns related to FDA recalls suffer from a loss of almost 6%
one day before and one day after the recall announcement. Tables 3.15 and 3.16 present the
average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for FDA and USDA
recalls over the study period of 2007. The fact that the stock return retreat starts one or two
days prior to the recall announcement may serve as an indication of insider-trading activity.
The recall information could have been available to investors through sources other than
the government. For FDA recalls, the stock return reaches its lowest point two days after
the announcement but bounces back quickly in the following 5 to 15 days for about 2%.
The return movement after the announcement is less intuitive for USDA recalls. In general,
investors experience significant losses± 2 around the announcement day and returns remain
flat from 10 to 15 days after the announcement.
However, the volatility of the CAAR in the tail part of Figure 3.2 signals additional
information flow during that period of time. In other words, market news other than the
food recall announcements begin to affect the stock market prices around 5 days after
the event date. Thus, we shorten the event window to ± 5 days around the food recall
announcement day, and these results are reported in Figure 3.3. The CAAR for FDA
recalls flattens two days after the event while the figure of USDA recalls continues to decline
after the announcement. Combining Figures 3.2 and 3.3, we conclude that food recall
announcements have a negative impact on the return of the associated companies, but the
negative effects die out in a short period of time (around 5 days).
3.5 Concluding Comments
The first part of this paper analyzes a new way of modeling intraday volatility and
return. We modified the High-Frequency Multiplicative GARCH model and improved the
model performance through the decomposition of the conditional variance into three parts
that can be estimated and interpreted. The empirical results show that even after filter-
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TABLE 3.15
Abnormal Returns of FDA Food Recalls
Event Day AAR CAAR
-5 0.002 0.002
-4 0.001 0.003
-3 -0.002 0.002
-2 -0.002 -0.001
-1 -0.010 -0.010
0 -0.009 -0.020
1 -0.004 -0.024
2 -0.008 -0.032
3 -0.008 -0.040
4 -0.007 -0.047
5 0.001 -0.046
TABLE 3.16
Abnormal Returns of USDA Food Recalls
Event Day AAR CAAR
-5 -0.007 -0.007
-4 0.000 -0.007
-3 0.009 0.001
-2 -0.005 -0.003
-1 0.009 0.006
0 -0.010 -0.004
1 -0.009 -0.013
2 -0.005 -0.018
3 0.000 -0.018
4 0.004 -0.015
5 -0.005 -0.019
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ing the daily and diurnal volatility component, the intraday volatility remains persistent
through the trading hours. We applied the model to a single stock SLE and three food sec-
tors during March 2007. The second part of this paper is a study of the dynamics between
intraday and overnight returns. Contrary to most of the research on overnight surprises, our
research does not find a strong relation between intraday and overnight returns. We analyze
both FDA and USDA recall cases. For FDA recalls, which include food, pet food, and farm
animal feed, the top ten most actively traded companies are selected in each of the three
food sectors. For USDA recalls, which include meat and poultry products, and eggs, two
meat recall cases are selected during March 2007. We analyze the relation between intraday
and overnight returns of the two associated companies. There are two possible explanations
to this insignificant relation. The first is the fast dying-out effect of overnight news during
the opening of the market. So most of the news impact has already been priced in during
the trading hours and reflected in the intraday volatility. We assume that the overnight
news is fully reflected in the opening price. Secondly, in our empirical study of the recall
market, the majority of the news happens during the day as opposed to the close of the
market.This is consistent with the high volatility during the trading hours in comparison
with the off-trading hours. In the third part, we apply an event study approach to the FDA
and USDA recalls during 2007. Research results show that stock returns start to decline
around two days prior to the announcement of the recall, and the total loss to an investor
invested in those associated stocks is about 4 to 6%. Stock returns remain flat for around
10 to 15 days with some degree of volatility, which is more evident in the USDA recall cases
than the FDA recall cases. The negative impact of food recalls dies out around 5 days after
the announcement.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation has examined two different groups of objectives in the realm of macro
and financial economics. Aggregate investment fluctuation and individual firms’ interde-
pendence behavior, intraday volatility, intraday and overnight returns, and stock markets’
responses toward a food recall event are studied in two essays. The first essay of this
dissertation presents a distributional test and an econometric model that investigates the
amplification mechanism of aggregate investment fluctuation. We present empirical evi-
dence that the fraction of firms that experience a large investment rate in the same region
and industry is distributed exponentially. This finding puts a question on the modeling
strategy that attributes the cause of aggregate investment fluctuations to a collection of
unspecified exogenous shocks outside of the model, because such a collection of shocks will
form a Gaussian noise to the aggregate investment. An alternative model of endogenous
investment fluctuations is proposed to analyze the endogenous effects of firms’ investment
behavior. This econometrical model has a robust nature to generate the exponential distri-
bution and separates individual firms’ interdependence reaction from the exogenous effects
of common shocks.
The second essay of this dissertation empirically tests and estimates a modified High-
Frequency Multiplicative Components GARCH model using a sample of interday and in-
traday trading data from over 30 publicly traded food sector companies in the United
States in 2007. The modified High-Frequency Multiplicative Components GARCH model
breaks daily volatility into three parts: daily volatility, deterministic intraday volatility, and
stochastic intraday volatility. An empirical application of this econometric model shows a
significant level of persistence of stock market return intraday volatility. Based on a study
of dynamics between intraday and overnight returns, this study concludes that there is
little connection between the intraday and overnight returns. This is consistent with the
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high volatility during the trading hours in comparison with the off-trading hours. In the
third part, we apply an event study approach to the FDA and USDA recalls during 2007.
Research results show that stock returns start to decline around two days prior to the
announcement of the recall, and the total loss to an investor invested in those associated
stocks is about 4 to 6%. Stock returns remain flat for around 10 to 15 days with some
degree of volatility, which is more evident in the USDA recall cases than the FDA recall
cases. The negative impact of food recalls dies out around 5 days after the announcement.
By following an event analysis methodology, our study finds strong evidence that the food
recall announcements have negative impacts on the asset returns of the associated publicly
traded firms.
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FIGURE A.1
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FIGURE A.3
Histogram of Firm’s Investment Rates with IPK(i, t) from 1 to 50
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FIGURE A.4
Histogram of Firm’s Investment Rates with IPK(i, t) from 1 to 100
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TABLE A.1
Estimation Results for Daily Volatility GARCH (p and q) Model
ω β γ AIC Log Likelihood
p=0, q=1 .000 β1 = -.124 -6.543 74.969
(.000) (.311)
p=1, q=1 .000 β1 = -.191 γ1 = 1.163** -6.708 77.788
(.000) (.238) (.254)
p=1, q=2 .000 β1 = -.055 γ1 = -.034 -6.514 76.652
(.000) (.354) (.311)
β2 = -.815
(.768)
p=2, q=1 .000 β1 = -.249 γ1 = .876 -6.629 77.291
(.000) (.287) (1.181)
γ2 = -.364
(1.146)
p=2, q=2 .000 β1 = -.267 γ1 = .503 -6.592 78.510
(.000) (.269) (1.493)
β2 = -.137 γ2 = .832
(.402) (1.629)
TABLE A.2
Estimation Results for Stochastic Intraday Volatility GARCH (p and q) Model
ω β γ AIC Log-Likelihood
p=0, q=1 .779** β1 = .187** 2.772 -28975.3
(.003) (.004)
p=1, q=1 .064** β1 = .093** γ1 = .843** 2.718 -28406.9
(.002) (.002) (.004)
p=1, q=2 .040** β1 = .141** γ1 = .898** 2.724 -28415.2
(.002) (.003) (.003)
β2 = -.078**
(.002)
p=2, q=1 .079** β1 = .117** γ1 = .448** 2.719 -28410.3
(.003) (.003) (.020)
γ2 = .356**
(.018)
p=2, q=2 .015** β1 = .136 γ1 = 1.375 2.720 -28420.7
(.000) (.269) (1.493)
β2 = -.110** γ2 = -.415**
(.003) (.034)
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TABLE A.3
Sample Size of FDA Recalls
Month Number of Recalls Number of Recalls
Associated with Publicly
Traded Firms
January 16 0
February 31 0
March 58 7
April 46 0
May 37 1
June 27 1
July 24 2
August 34 1
September 28 1
October 25 4
November 24 1
December 34 0
Total 384 18
TABLE A.4
Sample Size of USDA Recalls
Month Number of Recalls Number of Recalls
Associated with Publicly
Traded Firms
January 9 0
February 5 2
March 3 3
April 4 0
May 4 0
June 7 1
July 4 0
August 2 0
September 4 0
October 3 1
November 5 0
December 4 0
Total 54 7
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TABLE A.5
FDA Class I Recalls and Safety Alerts During 2007
Date Description of the Recall
March 6 Bausch & Lomb Initiates Limited Voluntary Recall of Twelve Lots of ReNu
MultiPlus Solutions Due to Potential for Shortened Shelf Life
March 9 BJ’s Wholesale Club Issues Recall of “Berkley & Jensen” Full-Cut Pig Ears
Dog Treats Because of Potential for Salmonella Contamination;
March 9 Safeway Recalls Bread in Parts of California and Nevada
March 16 Ben & Jerry’s Issues Allergy Alert on Undeclared Wheat in Ben & Jerry’s
Country Peach Cobbler Ice Cream
March 16 Hill’s Pet Nutrition Announces Voluntary Participation in Menu Foods’s Na-
tionwide U.S. and Canadian recall of Specific Canned Cat Foods
March 24 Menu Foods Initiates Market Withdrawal of Wet Pet Food to Ensure Consumer
Protection
March 30 Del Monte Pet Products Voluntarily Withdraws Specific Product Codes of Pet
Treats and Wet Dog Food Products
May 25 Abbott Announces Voluntary Nationwide Recall of Similac Special Care Pre-
mature Infant Formula with Iron
June 5 Class I Recall: Alcon Refractive Horizons LADAR6000 Excimer Laser System
July 13 Gerber Announces Nationwide Voluntary Recall of Gerber ORGANIC Rice
Due to a Potential Choking Hazard
July 31 Whole Foods Market Issues Allergy Alert on Undeclared Nuts in 365 Organic
Everyday Value Swiss Dark Chocolate Bars
August 31 Urgent: Abbott Notifies Users of Kroger Blood Glucose Meters to Check Dis-
play Screens
September 17 Dole Announces Voluntary Recall of ’Dole Hearts Delight’ Packaged Salads
October 3 Kraft Foods Recalls Baker’s Premium White Chocolate Baking Squares Be-
cause of Possible Health Risk
October 4 Campbell Voluntarily Recalls Chunky Baked Potato With Cheddar & Bacon
Bits
October 5 Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. Issues Allergy Alert on Mislabeled Prestige Chocolate
Ice Cream
October 15 Statement on Medtronic’s Voluntary Market Suspension of Their Sprint Fidelis
Defibrillator Leads
November 16 Updated Recall Information: Thoratec Corporation Implantable Ventricular
Assist Devices (IVAD)
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TABLE A.6
USDA Recalls Archive During 2007
Date Description of the Recall
February 12 ConAgra Foods, Inc., a Milton, Pa., establishment, is voluntarily recalling ap-
proximately 402,623 pounds of pasta and meatball meals due to possible un-
derprocessing.
February 3 Morgan Foods, an Austin, Ind., firm, is voluntarily recalling approximately
6,317 pounds of chicken noodle soup due to the presence of undeclared allergens
(milk, soy).
March 2 Tyson Fresh Meats, a Wallula, Wash., firm, is voluntarily recalling approxi-
mately 16,743 pounds of ground beef that may be contaminated with E. coli
O157:H7.
March 9 Hempler Foods Group, a Ferndale, Wash., firm, is voluntarily recalling approx-
imately 5,084 pounds of summer sausage due to the presence of an undeclared
allergen, hydrolyzed sodium caseinate (milk protein).
March 27 Kraft Foods Global, Inc., a Kirksville, Mo., establishment, is voluntarily re-
calling approximately 1,800 pounds of bacon due to insufficient cooling during
processing.
June 8 Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., a Sherman, Texas, establishment, is voluntarily re-
calling approximately 40,440 pounds of ground beef products due to possible
contamination with E. coli O157:H7.
October 11 ConAgra Foods, a Marshall, Mo., firm, is voluntarily recalling an undetermined
amount of all varieties of frozen pot pie products in commerce that may be
linked to an outbreak of salmonellosis.
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